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The imposition of mandatory minimum sentences is a controversial subject in Canada, 
as it has been, and often continues to be, in many other jurisdictions. In an effort to 
strengthen criminal law, the government recently enacted the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act,1 thereby reviving the debate on mandatory sentences. In particular, 
the Act introduced new minima for crimes involving drugs2 and sexual offences 
against children.3 
The choice of this sentencing regime arouses the opposition of many scholars.4 In 
addition to conflicting with some of the sentencing principles promulgated in the 
Criminal Code,5 it is a clear violation of the traditional judicial discretion in the 
Canadian sentencing process. Similar opposition was expressed when Act 105 of 
1997 6  was introduced in South Africa, another state with a history of judicial 
discretion during sentencing. Despite marked differences between the two societies, 
South Africa provides an interesting comparative example which raises questions 
about the wisdom of the Canadian government’s new legislation.  
To analyse this matter, this paper first paints a portrait of mandatory penalties in 
Canada. After looking at the legislative history of prescribed minima and the 
government’s decision to halt the sentencing commission, we examine how these 
sentences interact with the statutory principles of sentencing enacted in 1996.7 
In the following chapter, we consider different scholars’ arguments against mandatory 
minima due to various difficulties that these minima can create: they generally 
provoke the inflation of sentence severity; they conflict with the principle of 
proportionality by imposing categorical judgments as to the seriousness of crimes; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State Immunity Act, the  
   Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release  
   Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and other Acts –  
   hereafter the Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 
2 Part 2, Sections 39 to 46 Safe and Streets Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c.1 
3 Part 2, Sections 10 to 38 Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 
4 Such as Anthony N. Doob, Stephan S.Terblanche and Julian V. Roberts 
5 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
6 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
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they hinder the proper functioning of the judicial system; and they can create 
injustices. 
Chapter 4 presents the legislation recently enacted by the Canadian government, 
which re-introduces mandatory minima for certain offenses. We consider the socio-
political background of the Safe Streets and Communities Act8 and the opposition 
against its introduction. 
The paper’s discussion then focuses on the South African experience. Chapter 5 
presents the sentencing framework in South Africa: we consider the guidelines applied 
by courts in the sentencing process, examine the principle of judicial discretion 
cherished by judges and finally study the case of Makwanyane 9 and its backlash. 
 Chapter 6 offers a closer look at Act 105 of 199710 and the introduction of a 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause11 for the imposition of mandatory 
penalties. We see that the Act generated great judicial dissatisfaction, and that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was required to provide guidance as to the application of the 
exemption clause. Despite the teachings of the Court, the application of this clause 
remains vague and we explore the interpretation that courts have given it. 
Finally, the last chapter offers a broad regard on both jurisdictions concerning the 
imposition of mandatory penalties, and proposes some lessons to be learned. After 
considering the pitfalls of such sentences in South Africa and the inconsistencies 
generated by the exemption clause, we examine the similarities and divergences of 
both societies. We take into account judicial legacy, legal cultures, socio-political 
values and political influence in the two jurisdictions, and try to understand whether 
these create a need for harsher sentences, which is the ultimate consequence of 
mandatory minima. We lastly acknowledge the common arguments put forward in 
both judicial systems to justify the imposition of mandatory penalties: the fact that 
they reduce disparity in sentencing, improve efficiency and effectiveness. Based on 
academics’ findings, we envisage other means to achieve the same goals. 
Looking back over the last 15 years since the imposition of mandatory minima in 
South Africa, what lessons can be learnt? This study will suggest that the Canadian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Safe and Streets Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c.1 
9 S v Makwanyane 195 (2) SACR 1 (CC) 
10 Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 
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government is unlikely to achieve its goals and to improve the Canadian criminal 
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CHAPTER 2 
MANDATORY PENALTIES IN CANADA 
 
2.1 Legislative history of mandatory minimum sentencing in Canada 
The first Criminal Code of Canada12 was enacted in 1892 and originally included only 
six offences which carried a minimum term of imprisonment. These offences were: 
engaging in a prize fight (three months), defrauding the government (one month), 
stealing mail bags (three years), stealing mail (three years), stopping the mail with 
intent to rob (five years), and corruption in municipal affairs (one month). The 
majority of these first mandatory minima were intended to enforce the legitimacy of 
public institutions.13  
Indeed, the legislative history of mandatory minimum sentencing in Canada reveals a 
strong attraction among politicians to these types of penalties, despite the conclusions 
of various commissions through the years. 14  Looking back at Canadian Senate 
hearings from 1952, it appears that politicians then had as much of a taste for 
mandatory minima as politicians today.15 When he appeared before the Senate in 
1952, the Minister of Justice announced: 
‘While there may be some merit in the recommendation of the Commission [which was 
reviewing the Criminal Code], we think that because of their deterrent effect, minimum 
penalties should not be entirely abolished, and it is for this reason that we propose they 
should be retained in respect of the offences I have just mentioned.’16 
 
This statement would not have seemed out of place in 1995, when the government 
imposed a new set of mandatory minima in its firearms-related legislation,17 or last 
year, when the government introduced the Safe Streets and Communities Act.18 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Criminal Code of Canada, 1892, c.29 
13 N Crutcher ‘The legislative history of Mandatory Minimum Penalties of Imprisonment in Canada’  
    (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 273-285 
14 See more details on Canadian Sentencing Commissions and their recommendations further on in  
    this section. 
15  A Doob & C Cesaroni ‘The political attractiveness of mandatory minimum sentences’ (2001) 39  
    Osgoode Hall L.J. 287  
16 Senate Official Report of Debates (1952) 210 in Doob & Cesaroni op cit (n15) 289 
17 Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 
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The offences referred to in 1952 included driving while intoxicated or while ability-
impaired, thefts of certain items from the post office, robbery of the mail, and theft of 
a motor car.19 Over the last few years in the Canadian Parliament, private members’ 
bills20 have been introduced to add new minimum sentences. There appears to be very 
little tolerance for repeat offenders and offences where a firearm is used. 21 
Consequently, approximately 40 offences in the Canadian Criminal Code22 carry a 
mandatory minimum prison sentence, 19 of which concern offences committed with 
the use of a firearm. These sentences were introduced as part of Bill C-68, 23 a package 
of firearms-related legislation in 1995.  
Deterrence was the main argument put forward by politicians to justify the 
introduction of this Bill and the many prescribed minimum sentences. In his first 
appearance before the House of Commons Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs,24 
Minister of Justice Rock Allan cited deterrence no fewer than nine times, and made no 
reference to any other sentencing purpose.25  
 
As Roberts points out, it is curious that deterrence seemed so pressing an objective, as 
the number of firearms offences had been declining steadily prior to the creation of the 
firearms mandatory minima.26 This underlines the fact that in Canada, as in many 
other jurisdictions, the political agenda has an important influence over determining 
the sentencing regime.  
Many alternatives were proposed before the adoption of Bill C-68 and the introduction 
of its new mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code. For instance, one 
suggestion was that the government should make the use of a firearm an aggravating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Doob & Cesaroni op cit (n15) 289 
20 A private member’s bill is a proposed law presented to the House of Commons by an individual  
    member of parliament (MP) who is not a cabinet minister. The MP who introduces a legislative  
    motion can be a member of a party represented in the government or in the opposition. 
21 Doob & Cesaroni op cit (n15) 289 
22 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
23 Bill C-68, An Act respecting firearms and other weapons, 1st session, 35th Parl., 1995, cl.19. Bill C-68  
    introduced 10 mandatory minimum sentences, each carrying four-year minimum sentences,    
    imposed on convicted offenders whose crimes were committed with a firearm. The Bill also created  
    8 minimum prison sentences for second-time convicted offenders, varying from 6 months to 2  
    years. See Criminal Code, R.C.S. 1985, c. C-46 
24 Regarding the Committee that was reviewing Bill C-68, see JV Roberts ‘Mandatory Minimum  
    Sentences of Imprisonment: Exploring the consequences for the sentencing process’ (2001) 39  
    Osgood Hall L.J. 314 
25 See Testimony by the Minister of Justice, 24 April 1995 in Roberts op cit (n24) 314 
26 For example, the number of robberies with a firearm declined by 39 per cent (from 8995 to 6646   
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factor in the gravity of the offence or that the government should opt for stricter 
firearm control. 27  The option of mandatory minimum sentences had also been 
considered previously. Under this version, different bands of mandatory minima 
would have been assigned. Each offence would therefore have been on a scale with 
the different bands reflecting their relative seriousness, as reflected in existing 
sentencing practice.28 This last proposal would have been a more meaningful way to 
reconcile these sentences with the codified principle of proportionality.  
Parliament decided instead to introduce a drastic four-year minimum sentence for ten 
new offences. It justified the severity of these sentences29 on the basis that harsher 
sentences would reduce the number of crimes committed with firearms. According to 
the government, potential offenders would henceforth be more deterred by the 
prospect of a minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment.30 However, before the 
introduction of the Bill, the government had had access to a study which found that 
minimum sentences were not a particularly good method of crime prevention.31 The 
study concluded that if the imposition of minimum sentences had any influence at all 
on crime rate reduction, the impact would be minimal. Moreover, the government had 
access to many other studies on the subject,32 all of which indicated the lack of any 
significant correlation between harsher sentences and crime reduction. 
Despite this research, a wave of mandatory sentences came into force in 1995. In 
bringing in these penalties, Parliament showed very little concern about the nature of 
the mandatory sentences in relation to the fundamental principle of sentencing. It 
demonstrated that Parliament ‘simply wanted to make a punitive statement about the 
criminal use of a firearm.’33 In reality, this choice was an ineffective means of ‘trying 
to better control violent crime.’34   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 H Dumont Disarming Canadians, and Arming Them with Tolerance: Banning Firearms and    
   Minimum Sentences to Control Violent Crime. An Essay on an Apparent Contradiction in ‘Mandatory  
   Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy’ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339 
28 Roberts op cit (n24) 319 
29 Dumont op cit (n27) 336 
30 Dumont op cit (n27) 338 
31 C Meredith, B Steinke & S Palmer ‘Research on the Application of the Criminal Code Section 85’  
     (1994) in Dumont op cit (n27) 348 
32 D Cousineau ‘Sanctions Légales et Dissuasion’ Canadian Sentencing Commission (1988); A    
    Blumstein, J Cohen & D Nagin (eds.) ‘Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of  
    Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates’ (1978) 95-159; WM Evan ‘Social Structure and Law:     
    Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’ (1990) 72-73 in Dumont op cit (n27) 348 
33 Roberts op cit (n24) 319 
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Analysing research conducted in the mid-1990s, Tonry suggested that: 
‘[…] most elected officials who support such laws are only secondarily interested in their 
effects; officials’ primary interests are rhetorical and symbolic. Calling and voting for 
mandatory penalties, as many state and federal officials repeatedly have done in recent 
years, is demonstration that officials are “tough on crime”. If the law “works”, all the 
better, but that is hardly crucial. In a time of heightened public anxiety about crime and 
social unrest, being on the right side of the crime issue is much more important politically 
than making sound and sensible public policy choices.’35 
 
As the federal political system of Canada consists of a parliamentary system formed of 
several parties, one might have imagined that the centre and left wing parties would 
have fought against the introduction of ‘tough on crime’ policies and the adoption of 
harsher sentences, such as mandatory minima. These parties have suggested that they 
understand what a limited role the criminal justice system ca  play in reducing 
crime.36 However, the dominant right-wing party held the majority between 1984 and 
1993,37 resulting in the adoption of gun control legislation that carries mandatory 
minima and an increase of about 25 per cent in the number of people in prison.38  
 
Between 1993 and 2006, the Liberal party (centre-left wing) was elected the majority 
party for two terms in a row and, despite the introduction of private members’ bills in 
Parliament, no amendments were made to the Criminal Code that would have added, 
repealed or modified the statutory minimum sentences. Since the re-election of the 
Conservative party in 2006, mandatory penalties have been reintroduced onto the 
policy agenda, as will b  discussed below. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 M Tonry ‘Mandatory Penalties’ in Crime and Justice: A review of Research, M. Tonry, ed. 16 (1992) 
    244 
36 AN Doob ‘The new role of parliament in Canadian sentencing’ (March/April 1997) 9 Federal  
   Sentencing Reporter 239 
37 Canadian political parties in power since 1968: Liberal (Trudeau) 1968-1979, Progressive  
    Conservative (Clark) 1979-1980, Liberal (Trudeau) 1980-1984, Liberal (Turner) 1984, Progressive  
    Conservative (Mulroney) 1984-1993, Progressive Conservative (Campbell) 1993, Liberal (Chrétien)  
    1993-2003, Liberal (Martin) 2003-2006, Conservative (Harper) 2006 – present. See  
    http://www.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/Compilations/FederalGovernment/MinistriesDuration.aspx 
38 This increase is shown for the period between 1986-1987 and 1995- 996; see AN Doob op cit (n36)  
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2.2 The current situation regarding mandatory minima in Canada 
Currently, minimum sentences in Canada can be broken down into four principal 
categories. The first type is a mandatory life sentence imposed upon conviction for 
only three offences: treason, first degree and second degree murder.39 The second type 
consists mainly of firearms offences.40 Since the enactment of Bill C-68, it is the 
largest category and today encompasses 16 offences. The third type of mandatory 
minimum sentences relates to repeat offenders. It applies only to an offender with at 
least one previous conviction for the same offence. The seven offences in this 
category relate to impaired driving, betting and possession of unauthorised weapons.41 
Finally, the fourth type of minimum sentence concerns hybrid offences. For these 
offences, Crown prosecutors have the option of electing to proceed by way of 
summary offences, for which punishment does not usually carry a mandatory 
minimum sentence, or by way of indictment, where a conviction will result in the 
imposition of a minimum sentence.42  
 
2.3 The Canadian Sentencing Commission 
In 1984, a sentencing reform process was initiated with the creation of the Canadian 
Sentencing Commission. This was the first Commission of Inquiry in the nation’s 
history devoted exclusively to sentencing, 43 established ‘in recognition that serious 
problems exist in the structure of sentencing and that these problems could only be 
resolved by a comprehensive set of recommendations, which reflect the complexities 
of the criminal justice system as a whole’. 44  In February 1987, the Canadian 
Sentencing Commission issued a complete report that contained integrated and 
sophisticated reforms founded upon a ‘just deserts’ sentencing philosophy which 
would allow judges some latitude in pursuit of utilitarian sentencing goals.45  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Section 47(1) & (4), Section 235(1) & (2) Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46  
40 Section 85(3) Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
41 Section 255, Section 202(2), Section 92(3) Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
42 For example, see Section 271 (Sexual assault) or Section 380(1) & (1.1) (Fraud), Criminal Code,  
    R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
43 JV Roberts ‘Sentencing Reform: The Canadian Approach’ (March/April 1997) 9 Federal Sentencing  
    Reporter 245 
44 Canadian Sentencing Commission ‘Sentencing Reform: A Canadian approach’ (1987) 2  
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Moreover, the report included a chapter on Mandatory Minimum Penalties that 
outlined issues around their imposition.46 The Commission’s recommendation on this 
matter was quite strict: it recommended that mandatory minimum sentences should be 
abolished for all offences except murder and high treason.47 In its reasoning, the 
Commission noted that, since 1952, ‘all Canadian commissions that have addressed 
the role of mandatory minimum penalties have recommended that they be 
abolished’.48 
The Commission’s reform package received a generally favourable reaction from 
academics, criminal justice professionals and even some trial court judges. However, 
the federal government, which is ultimately responsible for criminal law reform, 
rejected it.49 
The Commission was abolished as part of a series of government financial cuts. In its 
absence, mandatory minimum penalties have continued to be enforced by the 
government. This is unfortunate as the country would benefit from the establishment 
of a Sentencing Commission that would assess sentencing changes over time. Such an 
institution could, for example, assess any changes in the incidence of crimes for which 
mandatory minimums are imposed. The creation of a permanent Sentencing 
Commission would enable the development of more coherent policy regarding 
sentencing.  
In this respect, the Canadian Sentencing Commission listed a number of critical 
functions that the commission could perform in relation to mandatory minimum 
sentences.50 First, it could provide the federal Department of Justice and Parliament 
with an objective examination of the results of research into the effectiveness (or 
disadvantages) of mandatory sentencing in general. Secondly, it would allow 
Parliament to know how its mandatory minimum sentence legislation was being 
implemented. Thirdly, the commission could provide models for ways in which to 
structure the creation of new mandatory minima, such as the ones that were introduced 
in the newly enacted Safe Streets and Communities Act.51 Finally, the most important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Chapter 3.3 of the Report	  
47 A Doob ‘Projet Muse: The Unfinished Work of the Canadian Sentencing Commission’ (2011) 53  
    CJCCJ 282 
48 Doob & Cesaroni op cit (n15) 289 
49 Roberts op cit (n43) 245 
50 Roberts op cit (n24) 328-329 
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contribution that could be made by a permanent sentencing commission would be to 
remind Parliamentarians if and when legislative proposals come into conflict with the 
statutory framework for sentencing established by Parliament itself in 1996.52 The 
latest is a major issue in the Canadian sentencing context for which the Courts have 
not yet found an effective and comprehensive remedy.  
Due to the absence of a permanent sentencing commission, the Canadian legislative 
history of mandatory minimum sentencing has been inconsistent, led by a political 
agenda. While, for financial reasons, the government chose to abolish a sentencing 
commission that had proven efficient, the same government does not hesitate to 
promote the imposition of mandatory minima, which appear to be very costly for 
society. The government is clearly imposing its agenda onto the sentencing regime to 
further its own political goals. This is even more morally questionable considering that 
some of these minima are imposed in violation of several elements of the statement of 
the statutory purpose and principles of sentencing, which will now be discussed in 
detail. 
 
2.4 Mandatory minimum penalties and the statutory principles of sentencing 
  
In 1996, based on the reforms introduced by Bill C-41,53 Parliament amended the 
Criminal Code to codify the purposes and principles of sentencing.54 For Parliament to 
be consistent and coherent with the implementation of its legislation, one would 
assume that mandatory minima are constructed with a clear consideration of their 
relationship to the codified principles of sentencing. However, this assumption seems 
unfounded and such penalties often interfere with the sentencing principles. Since the 
codification of sentencing purposes and principles, Parliament has enacted many ad 
hoc pieces of exceptional legislation contrary to the general sentencing principles 
implemented in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code.55 So, on the one hand, Canadian 
judges have at their disposal the purposes and principles of sentencing that were 
conscientiously codified in 1996 and, on the other, mandatory minima that cannot be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Section 718 – 718.2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46	  
53 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and Other Acts in Consequence Thereof, S.C.   
   1995, c.22 (Bill C-41) 
54 Section 718.1 – 718.2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
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justified by those principles, and are therefore described by some as simply an attempt 
by Parliament to denounce and deter.56 
The adoption of ad hoc mandatory minima for various categories of offences can be 
seen as a major affront to two of the principles that were enacted in 1996. First, the 
principle of restraint, expressed in s718.2(d): ‘an offender should not be deprived of 
liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances’, and 
s718.2(e): ‘all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of aboriginal offenders’. Secondly, it also transgresses the principle of 
proportionality, which was designated as the fundamental principle of sentencing by 
s718.1: ‘a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree 
of responsibility of the offender’.  
The imposition of mandatory minima can therefore be challenged constitutionally on 
the basis that it infringes one of these fundamental rights of an accused, and indeed it 
has been in the case of Smith, 57  the Supreme Court’s first decision on the 
constitutionality of mandatory sentences. The Court found that a mandatory sentence 
of seven years’ imprisonment for importing narcotics constituted a violation of s12 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,58 which contains a prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. When considering a violation of the rights of the 
accused under the Charter, the Court must proceed by a two-step analysis. First, the 
Court must decide wh ther there was a violation of one of the provisions of the 
Charter. If it reaches that conclusion, the Court must then consider whether this 
violation could be justified under s1 of the Charter.59 
Writing for the Court in Smith,60 Mr Justice Lamer mentioned that courts should show 
deference to Parliament and warned the courts not to ‘stigmatise every 
disproportionate or excessive sentence’ as unconstitutional, but only those that were 
grossly disproportionate and ‘so excessive as to outrage standards of decency’.61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Roberts op cit (n24) 314	  
57 R v Smith 1987 1 S.C.R. 1045 
58 The Constitution Act of 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, part 1   
59 Section 1:  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set  
    out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in  
    a free and democratic society. 
60 R v Smith supra (n57) 
61 R v Smith supra (n57) at 1072. While Justice Wilson, Justice LeDrain and Justice La Forrest agreed  










	   15 
Having concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years’ 
imprisonment prescribed in s5(1) of the Narcotic Control Act62 (without regard to the 
type or quantity of the substance involved) would constitute a cruel and unusual 
punishment, Mr. Justice Lamer held that the s12 violation had not been justified under 
s1 of the Charter. Although the mandatory sentence was rationally connected to the 
important objective of deterring the import of drugs, there was ‘no need to be 
indiscriminate’:63 Parliament could have tailored the mandatory penalty so that it did 
not apply to small-time offenders. 
Until recently, the violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
was the basis on which the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence could be 
challenged.  Yet in a recent decision,64 the Supreme Court considered the reduction of 
a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum as appropriate reparation in a case 
of state misconduct under s24(1) of the Charter.65 Even though the Court recognised 
the possibility of challenging mandatory sentences under s24(1), it held that 
sentencing judges had no right to override a clear statement of legislative intent and 
reduce a sentence below a statutory mandated minimum in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances. Such derogation might be appropriate only for some ‘particularly 
egregious’66 forms of state misconduct, but in usual cases the mandatory minimum 
sentence set out by Parliament must be applied. 
The Supreme Court of Canada sets a very high test for courts to depart from a 
prescribed minimum s ntence, in the context of a violation under s24(1) of the 
Charter. The ‘grossly disproportionate and excessive’ criteria developed in Smith,67 
which would amount to a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, are mirrored by any ‘particularly egregious’ form of misconduct that 
would merit reparation for violation of a right guaranteed by the Charter in 
Nasogaluak. 68  Despite this new constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    was the only member of the panel to join Justice Lamer’s reasoning. 
62 Narcotic Control Act, R. S. C., 1985, c. N-1 [repealed 1996, c. 19, s.94]	  
63 K Roach ‘The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences’ (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L. J. 371 
64 R v Nasogaluak 2010 1 S.C.R. 206 
65 Section 24(1): Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed  
    or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court  
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66 R v Nasogaluak supra (n64) at 64 
67 R v Smith supra (n57) at 1072 
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Canada has maintained its position: statutory mandatory minima are constitutional and 
must be applied, unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. 
Since its decision in Smith, 69 the Court has upheld every mandatory minimum 
sentence that has been challenged under s12 of the Charter. Roach suggests that this 
change in the Supreme Court approach towards mandatory sentences and the impact 
that it might have in the future is not only due to the ‘twists and turns that can be 
detected in the doctrine, but also [to] deeper and more fundamental shifts in both 
constitutional law and sentencing’. 70  His analysis is based on the evolving 
jurisprudence that has challenged mandatory sentences under s12 of the Charter. 
These sentences include mandatory life imprisonment and ineligibility for parole for 
25 years for first degree murder;71 mandatory life imprisonment and ineligibility for 
parole for at least ten years for second degree murder;72 a seven-day mandatory 
minimum sentence for driving with a suspended driving licence;73and a four-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for criminal negligence causing death by a firearm.74 
Roach examines these decisions in light of the Court’s changing approach to Charter 
review and suggests the four following statements. First, Roach points out that the 
Canadian sentencing scene has experienced significant changes in recent years. 
Parliament has codified the principles and purposes of sentencing,75 and has declared 
that the proportionality of the sentence to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offender as fundamental principles of sentencing. It has also 
increased the number of mandatory sentences in an attempt to deter and denounce a 
broad range of crimes.76   
 
The Court, for its part, has recognised denunciation and retribution as legitimate 
purposes of sentencing and has drawn a dichotomy between punitive purposes, which 
focus on punishing the offender and deterring others, and restorative purposes, which 
focus on rehabilitating the offender and responding to the needs of the offender, the 
victim and the community. In doing so, the Court has departed from a strict ‘due 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 R v Smith supra (n57)	  
70 Roach op cit (n63) 369 
71 R v Luxton 1990 2 S.C.R. 711 
72 R v Latimer 2001 1 S.C.R. 3 
73 R v Goltz 1991 3 S.C.R. 485 
74 R v Morrisey 2000 2 S.C.R. 90 
75 Section 718 – 718.2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 
76 Those crimes are mainly related to crimes involving firearms and child prostitution – See Roach op  
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process’ approach to protecting the constitutional rights of the accused and, instead, 
has balanced competing rights and interests in criminal justice, often deferring to 
Parliament’s attempt to protect the victims and potential victims of crime. This 
dichotomy drawn by the Supreme Court of Canada suggests that it shares a rather 
populist opinion of human motivation. In fact, the Court ‘appears to be arguing that a 
careless hunter or careless gun owner would shrug off a gun accident that would take 
the life of a friend or fellow hunter unless there was a mandatory minimum 
sentence.’77 
Accordingly, the Court has become more restrained about applying the Charter to 
potentially ill-defined laws and more deferential to Parliament’s decision to enact 
mandatory penalties that stress some purposes of punishment over others. For 
example, the Court built on the acceptance of denunciation and retribution in R v 
M(C.A.) 78  and Parliament’s proclamation of proportionality as the fundamental 
principle of sentencing, to uphold mandatory sentences in Morrisey79 and Latimer:80 
 ‘The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should communicate society’s 
condemnation of that particular offender’s conduct.  In short, a sentence with a 
denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s 
conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as 
enshrined within our substantive criminal law.  [Emphasis in original.]’81 
 
 
The restrained intervention of the Court in application of the Charter and its 
acquiescence to Parliament’s principles has led the Court to uphold every mandatory 
minimum sentence that has been constitutionally challenged since Smith.82  
Furthermore, the Court has shown an increased acceptance of the retributive ‘just 
deserts’ principle. In theory, this principle should not result in harsher sentencing and, 
when properly applied, does not constitute an argument in favour of mandatory 
sentencing. In fact, the primary basis of the contemporary desert theory83 for deciding 
the quantum of punishments is the principle of proportionality or ‘commensurate 
deserts’, requiring the severity of the penalty to be proportionate to the gravity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Doob & Cesaroni op cit (n15) 291 
78 R v M (C.A.) 1996 1 S.C.R. 500 
79 R v Morrisey supra (n74) 
80 R v Latimer supra (n72) 
81 R v M (C.A.) supra (n78) at 81 
82 R v Smith supra (n57) 
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defendant’s criminal conduct. The criterion for deciding the quantum of punishment is 
thus ‘retrospective rather than consequentialist’: the seriousness of the offence for 
which the defendant stands convicted.84  
 
The issue in this instance is that the Court has become more prepared to focus 
objectively on the gravity of the offence and the offender’s responsibility for the 
offence (requiring proof of fault), even in the case of non-intentional crimes that result 
in serious harm.  The cases of Morrisey85 and Latimer86 illustrate the narrow approach 
favoured by the Court, which considers the moral responsibility of offenders and the 
circumstances of offences by focusing on the mens rea of the crime committed as a 
primary justification for the imposition of mandatory sentences. This approach is not 
far removed from a purely retributivist policy87 which focuses on the consequences of 
the crime committed, rather than a ‘just desert’ principle which would encompass a 
comprehensive theory of criminal justice88 by also taking into account considerations 
such as the need to deter and to rehabilitate offenders in the light of their individual 
characteristics.   
 
The decision as to whether to retain mandatory sentences currently appears to be 
almost exclusively in the hands of Parliament. Effectively, the Court seems to be 
increasingly attracted to consti utional minimalism and passive virtues involved in 
deciding one case at a time. But attempting to prove a case-specific exemption is a 
very high burden for the accused, as he or she would have to prove that the mandatory 
sentence reaches the qualification of a cruel and unusual punishment, a burden much 
higher than the demonstration of exceptional circumstances.   
 
As Hélène Dumont points out in her article about mandatory minimum sentences in 
the context of firearms legislation,89 constitutional minimalism and the passive virtues 
that the Supreme Court now favours lead to the withdrawal of judicial authority for 
the benefit of executive power: 
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‘At the expense of effective constitutional safeguards for the control of sentencing laws, 
the Supreme Court is not offering the next best thing to the offender who could be 
exposed to a cruel punishment: a constitutional exemption. The Supreme Court stops 
controlling the legislator from enacting unjust sentencing laws – a moral lesson suffices. 
Indeed, the Court will not apply the law in a case where an extremely disproportionate 
punishment could be inflicted on an extraordinarily likeable offender, but now, it will not 
offer a remedy to an unjust sentencing law. The judicial authority washes its hands, even 
if it sees an injustice done by the legislator!’90 
 
This new tendency of the Court towards constitutional minimalism represents an 
alarming deference to Parliament’s decision to impose mandatory minimum 
sentences, since only an independent judiciary can withstand the political allure of 
mandatory sentences.91 The exercise of any judicial discretion is now prevented, as the 
default penalty is predetermined by the legislator.  
 
Roach suggests that ‘the choice over mandatory sentences may well be Parliament’s 
and it may only be the wisdom and self-restraint of Parliament that will prevent the 
whole-sale introduction of a raft of American-style mandatory penalties’.92 This is 
exacerbated by the fact that Canadian sentencing courts do not have the discretion to 
impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum prescribed by the law. In contrast to 
most other jurisdictions93 where a judicial discretionary clause permits judges to 
impose a lesser sentence where exceptional circumstances exist, Canadian law does 
not offer judges such an ‘escape clause’ or provision for exceptional circumstances.94 
Consequently, Courts have to find a violation of the accused’s constitutional right in 
order to justify a departure from the norm.  
 
The evolving jurisprudence of the Supreme Court shows that the shifts in both 
constitutional law and sentencing have changed the Court’s position when it is asked 
to determine whether a mandatory sentence is grossly disproportionate.  Since Smith,95 
not only has the Court upheld mandatory minima, but it has steadfastly refused to 
strike down or abstain from applying a mandatory sentence as a form of cruel and 
unusual punishment under s12 of the Charter, or as an appropriate reparation in a case 
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of state misconduct under s24(1) of the Charter. If there is no breach of s12 or 24(1), 
the Court cannot assess the s1 test of justification. The Court has therefore never had 
to determine whether one of the mandatory minimums constituted a ‘reasonable limit 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’ or 
whether, as in the case of Smith,96 Parliament could have tailored the mandatory 
penalty in a way that it would have been less restrictive.  
On the one hand, the Canadian parliament continues to introduce mandatory sentences 
according to its own agenda, an agenda that can often hardly be reconciled with the 
codified sentencing principles.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
recently demonstrated a changing approach to Charter review and an increasing 
deference to parliament’s legislation.  These factors account for the pitfalls of the 
current minimum mandatory sentences regime in Canada.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PITFALLS OF MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCES IN CANADA 
 
In many jurisdictions, the imposition of mandatory penalties has been criticised as 
being an inefficient way to achieve the sentencing purposes. Canada is no exception. 
Despite Parliament’s enthusiasm and its new wave of mandatory minima, scholars 
continue to oppose the introduction of such sentences in the Canadian regime. Many 
arguments have been brought forward which raise serious doubts about the 
Parliament’s choice. 
  
3.1 Ordinal proportionality or the inflation of sentence severity 
Until recently, Canada has had great stability in sentencing over the past half century 
and has avoided more punitive tendencies. Doob and Webster97 explain that Canadian 
sentencing policies have historically been guided by the notion that multiple purposes 
of sentencing exist and that judges are responsible for choosing the most relevant 
purposes for each case. Canadian judges have had wide discretion to choose among 
the standard purposes of sentencing98 and to sentence within a range determined 
largely by practice and by guidance from Appeal courts. Even when Parliament 
introduced the purposes and principles of sentencing in 1996, those provisions did not 
challenge the guiding notions which had been in place for decades as a result of 
judicial decisions. 99  In fact, the introduction of the purposes and principles of 
sentencing into legislation was seen as little more than a codification of the status quo. 
By referring to all the sentencing purposes, the codification offers little guidance and, 
accordingly, has had little impact on sentencing practices at the trial court level. 100 
Nevertheless, some changes have been reflected in the Supreme Court’s decisions 
since it invalidated a mandatory sentence under s12 of the Charter in Smith.101 In 
particular, the Court has increased its focus on the gravity of the offence committed by 
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the offender; it has increased its concern about the need to denounce crimes and 
punish them proportionately; 102 and it has greater acceptance of the ability of 
Parliament to emphasise the punitive purposes of sentencing by enacting mandatory 
sentences.103 
One can argue that this direction of the Court is not in accordance with the 
fundamental principle of proportionality as adopted in the 1996’s reform of the 
Criminal Code. Roberts, Dumont and Roach adopt this point of view. For Roberts,104 
‘mandatory sentences are inconsistent with the principle of proportionality and indeed 
with a sentencing system based on the “just deserts” philosophy’. Dumont,105 for her 
part, suggests that the principle of proportionality signifies a rejection of the idea of 
achieving general deterrence by making a particular sentence more severe and 
imposing exemplary punishment on a specific criminal. The deterrent impact of a 
particular sentence is not supported by empirical research106 and so it is questionable 
whether it has any effect on the crime rate. Dumont therefore suggests that the 
principle of proportionality should be re-established on a firmer ground to measure 
crimes and punishments. In her opinion, proportionality should be applied to allow 
sentencing flexibility and moderation, as opposed to the logic of escalation that the 
Supreme Court and the legislator are currently applying in sentencing.  
On the other hand, Roach107 argues that adherence to the principle of proportionality, 
combined with the advent of mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment, will 
cause the inflation of sentence severity, as minimum sentences provide a starting 
point, or floor, for a proportional scale of punishment. In order to retain 
proportionality in the face of the new minimum sentences, the entire range of 
sentences for one particular offence will have to shift upward. If the mandatory 
sentence is designed for the ‘best’ offender and the ‘best’ offence within a particular 
crime, it should require punishment above the mandatory minimum for more 
blameworthy offenders. In this way, ‘a concern about maintaining the proportionality 
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of relative punishment can increase punishment to keep up with the inflated floor that 
Parliament has set for the best offender and the best offence’.108   
Roach109 further suggests that mandatory minima may influence sentencing patterns 
by inflating the severity of sentences imposed for other offences as well. He based his 
analysis on the logic of ordinal proportionality that Madame Justice Arbour adopted in 
the cases of Wust110 and Morrisey.111 In the latter, she put her argument as follows: 
‘To the extent possible, mandatory minimum sentences must be read consistently with the 
general principles of sentencing expressed, in particular, in ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of 
the Criminal Code: Wust (S.C.C.), supra, at para. 22.  By fixing a minimum sentence, 
particularly when the minimum is still just a fraction of the maximum penalty applicable 
to the offence, Parliament has not repudiated completely the principle of 
proportionality and the requirement, expressed in s. 718.2(b), that a sentence should be 
similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in 
similar circumstances.  Therefore, in my view, the mandatory minimum sentences for 
firearms-related offences must act as an inflationary floor, setting a new minimum 
punishment applicable to the so-called “best” offender whose conduct is caught by these 
provisions.  The mandatory minimum must not become the standard sentence imposed on 
all but the very worst offender who has committed the offence in the very worst 
circumstances.  The latter approach would not only defeat the intention of Parliament in 
enacting this particular legislation, but also offend against the general principles of 
sentencing designed to promote a just and fair sentencing regime and thereby advance the 
purposes of imposing criminal sanctions.’112 
 
Referring to the requirement that punishment should reflect the comparative 
seriousness of crimes, Roach extrapolates from Madame Justice Arbour’s logic to 
include: 
 ‘a concern with the “rank ordering” of different offences in the sense that “punishing one 
crime more than another expresses more disapproval for the former crime, so that it is 
justified only if that crime is more serious”. Punishments thus are ordered on a penalty 
scale so that their relative severity reflects the seriousness ranking of the crimes 
involved.’113  
 
The problem is that the Supreme Court, judging by its recent decisions on the 
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for various offences, has already 
concluded that these sentences were proportionate or at least not so grossly 
disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, these mandatory 
minima are now the starting point for the courts to apply, as created by Parliament and 
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approved by the Court. Given the logic of ordinal proportionality as the fundamental 
principle of sentencing, every offence more serious than the ones for which a 
minimum sentence has been found constitutional should merit more severe 
punishment than the prescribed minimum for the original offence.  
Roberts,114 in response to Roach’s proposition, argues that the available empirical 
evidence suggests that sentences for an offence often cluster around the mandatory 
minimum penalty. For him, the core tenets of Canadian sentencing policy will not 
allow the mandatory minimum penalties to influence the range of sentences for a 
specific offence or sentencing patterns for other offences. 115  Roberts concedes, 
however, that the practice of imposing the same punishment violates the ordinal 
proportionality principle. In any event, judicial concerns about maintaining 
proportionality are not coherent with Parliament’s decision to enact mandatory 
sentences.  
 
3.2 Categorical judgments as to the seriousness of crimes 
Another way in which the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences is not 
coherent with the application of the principle of proportionality is that they impose 
categorical judgments as to the seriousness of crimes. Roberts116 illustrates this issue 
with the offence of manslaughter in the context of a case from the Ontario Court of 
Appeal.117 Since 1995, manslaughter perpetrated with a firearm now carries a four-
year minimum term of custody.118 By creating this minimum, Parliament has deemed 
this form of unintentional homicide to be more serious and more worthy of 
denunciation than manslaughter committed by other means.119 In R. v. Turcotte,120 the 
offender had used two telephone cords to strangle his frail, elderly mother. He was 
convicted of manslaughter and received a community-based sanction, which was 
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upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. If the offender had used a firearm, he would 
have been sentenced to a minimum of four years in prison. 
 This gradation of offences appears even more shocking when we consider the 
comparison that Roberts offers between a case of robbery involving a firearm and 
non-firearm manslaughter such as Turcotte.121 Here, again, the use of a firearm would 
have led to a four-year mandatory minimum sentence for the former offender, while 
the latter could receive a community-based sanction. The two cases chosen by Roberts 
underline the absurd outcomes which result from a simplistic application of the theory 
of proportionality relating to the seriousness of crimes. Seen in this light, the 
mandatory minima do not serve the interests of justice. Moreover, it can be argued 
that prescribed minima may infringe the core principles of judicial justice.  
 
3.3 Removal of judicial discretion, plea-bargaining and a threat to the 
presumption of innocence 
A national survey of judges conducted by the Canadian Sentencing Commission in 
1988122 revealed that mandatory minima find little support among members of the 
judiciary. This survey took place during the heyday of the Charter, a year after the 
Supreme Court’s judgment against mandatory minima in Smith123 and before the shift 
that took place within the Court in subsequent years. When judges were asked whether 
minimum sentences restricted the court’s ability to ‘give out a just sentence’, over half 
of the respondents said that it was.124 Roberts suggests that the fact that sentences for 
an offence often cluster around the mandatory minimum penalty demonstrates the 
judicial antipathy towards mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment.125 Even when 
a mandatory minimum is prescribed for a particular offence, judges might be expected 
to use the full range of possible penalties, up to the maximum sentence, to reflect the 
gravity of the offence.  In reality, the judges prefer to impose sentences akin to the 
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prescribed minimum, and so the mandatory minimum has become the de facto 
mandatory sentence.126 
Without an ‘escape clause’ or the possibility for judges to depart from the mandatory 
sentences under certain circumstances, the legislator removes the court’s discretion to 
impose an appropriate, individualised sentence on the offender in favour of a 
predetermined legislated sentence that is supposed to apply to all cases.127 The 
complete removal of judicial discretion can lead to the pernicious use of the 
prosecutor’s concealed discretion in deciding whether or not to charge an accused for 
a crime that carries a mandatory minimum sentence. According to Hélène Dumont, 
‘the judicial system cannot operate without discretion. In fact, it is an integral part of 
decisions and judgments, and should not be seen as something that is intrinsically 
bad’.128  
But if discretion is to be an integral part of decisions and judgments, it must remain in 
the hands of judges. The Canadian Sentencing Commission Report of 1988129 
indicated that mandatory minimum sentences contributed to inappropriate agreements 
between Crown and defence counsel. Most defence counsels and about one third of 
the Crown counsels surveyed indicated that mandatory minimum sentences ‘caused 
Crown and defence to enter into agreements that they would otherwise avoid’.130 If the 
law ties the hands of judges, the Crown and defence counsel can negotiate to find a 
way to avoid its application. However, when plea bargains replace trials, checks and 
balances are much mor  difficult to achieve and constitutional safeguards are at the 
mercy of discretionary decisions.  
The prospect of harsh mandatory sentences can result in two different scenarios: either 
proceedings will be more difficult and therefore longer and more expensive, as the 
defence will use every legal technicality possible to protect its client from a mandatory 
sentence, or Crown attorneys will find many reasons to offer a lesser sentence in 
exchange for a guilty plea on a charge that does not carry a minimum sentence.131 This 
latter scenario is pernicious and violates the sacred principle of the presumption of 
innocence: an individual charged with an offence carrying a mandatory sentence, 
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regardless of his or her culpability, might be placed under great pressure to plead 
guilty. Finally, by increasing the likelihood of plea-bargaining, mandatory minimum 
sentences generally reduce the likelihood of conviction for certain specific offences 
and therefore work contrary to the legislator’s objective of punishing offenders who 
commit those offences.132 
 
3.4 Do mandatory minimum sentences create injustices? 
As we have seen, the imposition of mandatory penalties in Canada does not allow any 
discretion for judges. The lack of an ‘escape clause’ prevents the judiciary from 
departing from their imposition, unless the defence can meet the high burden of proof 
that the sentence represents a cruel and unusual punishment in the circumstances.133  
This means that mandatory sentences will apply to every offender regardless of their 
individual characteristics and are thus likely to create injustice. As Roach 134 
recognises, one of the arguments put forward in favour of mandatory sentences is that 
they will hopefully provide protection for various disadvantaged groups that are 
subject to disproportionate victimisation. However, the same mandatory treatment of 
every offender will result in injustices when minimum sentences are applied to 
exceptional offenders who belong to disadvantaged groups that are supposed to be 
protected by the mandatory penalties. In practice, individuals such as women, the 
young, Aboriginal people, the disabled, and other vulnerable minorities who are 
thought to be protected by mandatory sentences may also end up being unfairly 
punished by them. For instance, incarcerating women adversely impacts on their  
health because of infrequent contact with family members and cohabitating with drug- 
using and mentally ill inmates.135  
 
The Collaborating Centre for Prison Health and Education (CCPHE) has also 
expressed concern about the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences. A very 
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recent study136 conducted by the Centre reveals that mandatory penalties have both 
negative health and social impacts. Indeed, research has shown that prisoners 
constitute a disadvantage group in themselves as, compared with the general 
population, they have poorer physical and mental health which only contributes 
further to their criminal activity when they are released from prison.137 For this reason, 
the CCPHE argues that the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences is not likely 
to improve public safety, but actually to create the opposite effect.138 The Centre 
highlights that: 
 ‘Currently, Canadian prisons do not deliver continuity of health care or continuity of 
social services such as counselling, mother-baby programs and harm reduction strategies. 
All of these services would enable inmates to successfully transition back into the 
community. Therefore, harsher sentencing coupled with a lack of prison reform fails to 
address the relationship between poor physical/mental health and criminal behaviour.’139 
 
Moreover, CCPHE argues that the fact that many criminals suffer from mental health 
or addiction problems which compromise their decision-making abilities calls into 
question the logic behind mandatory sentences.140 One of the main arguments put 
forward by the proponents of mandatory minima is that if individuals know the 
penalties beforehand they will be deterred from committing crime. The problem with 
this rationale is that it assumes that all crimes are premeditated and that individuals 
have the capacity to weight up the associated costs and benefits.141  
 
As mental issues and addiction problems alter this capacity for many individuals, one 
cannot assume that mandatory minima will achieve this purpose. For example, studies 
have shown that offenders do not discriminate between sentences of three years and 
five years when considering the punitive consequences of their actions.142  This 
demonstrates that severity of sentences and the imposition of mandatory penalties are 
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not necessarily likely to deter offenders from committing crimes, but can easily create 
disparities.  
 
As has been demonstrated, the imposition of mandatory minima is far from being 
unanimously supported and raises strong opposition in certain quarters. Nevertheless, 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAFE STREETS AND COMMUNITIES ACT 
 
4.1 Socio-political background 
In June 2011, the Canadian Prime Minister promised the nation that his Government 
would ‘move quickly to re-introduce comprehensive law-and-order legislation to 
combat crime and terrorism’.143 Such discourse is surprising considering that Canada 
is considered to be one of the safest countries in the world, with a crime rate that has 
actually been declining over recent years. 144  Nevertheless, the Conservative 
government has kept promoting the war on crime in order to justify the introduction of 
the Safe Streets & Communities Act,145 often referred to as the Omnibus Crime Bill:  
‘[T]his bill is a reflection of our commitment to tackling crime, increasing public safety, 




‘The Harper Government is committed to keeping our streets and communities safe. 
Youth crime and violence are serious concerns for many Canadian families and 
communities, which is why I am happy to announce today that we are once again 
investing in community-based projects that help those who are most at risk of offending. 
Projects that receive funding will provide at-risk youth with life skills that will empower 
them to make smart choices and to stay away from crime.’147 
 
On 12 March 2012, Bill C-10 was passed by the House of Commons in its final vote, 
with 154 Members of Parliament voting in favour and 129 against.148 The Safe Streets 
and Communities Act actually comprises nine smaller bills which were proposed by 
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the Conservatives when they were a minority government, but were never passed. 
With the new Conservative majority in both the House of Commons and the Senate, 
the Act passed all the measures at once. These are:  
· The Protecting Children from Sexual Predators Act (former Bill C-54), which proposes 
increased penalties for sexual offences against children, as well as creating two new 
offences aimed at conduct that could facilitate or enable the commission of a sexual 
offence against a child; 
 
· The Increasing Penalties for Organized Drug Crime Act (former Bill S-10), which 
targets organised crime by imposing tougher sentences for the production and possession 
of illicit drugs for the purposes of trafficking; 
 
· The Protecting the Public from Violent Young Offenders Act (former Bill C-4), which 
ensures that violent and repeat young offenders are held accountable for their actions and 
that the protection of society is a paramount consideration in the treatment of young 
offenders by the justice system;  
 
· The Ending House Arrest for Property and Other Serious Crimes by Serious and 
Violent Offenders Act (former Bill C-16), which eliminates the use of conditional 
sentences, or house arrest, for serious and violent crimes;  
 
· The Increasing Offender Accountability Act (former Bill C-39), which enshrines a 
victim's right to participate in parole hearings and addresses inmate accountability, 
responsibility, and management under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act; 
 
· The Eliminating Pardons for Serious Crimes Act (former Bill C-23B), which extends 
the ineligibility periods for applications for a record suspension (currently called a 
‘pardon’) to five years for summary conviction offences and to ten years for indictable 
offences; 
 
· The International Transfer of Canadian Offenders Back to Canada Act (former Bill C-
5), which adds additional criteria that the Minister of Public Safety could consider when 
deciding whether or not to allow the transfer of a Canadian offender back to Canada to 
serve their sentence; 
 
· The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and related amendments to the State Immunity 
Act (former Bill S-7), which allows victims of terrorism to sue perpetrators and 
supporters of terrorism, including listed foreign states, for loss or damage that occurred as 
a result of an act of terrorism committed anywhere in the world; and 
 
· The Protecting Vulnerable Foreign Nationals against Trafficking, Abuse and 
Exploitation Act (former Bill C-56), which authorises immigration officers to refuse work 
permits to vulnerable foreign nationals when it is determined that they are at risk of 
humiliating or degrading treatment, including sexual exploitation or human trafficking. 
 
 
The Safe Streets & Communities Act hence introduces new mandatory minimum 
sentences in the Canadian justice system for crimes related to drugs and sexual 
offences against children. However, the Act has not received the support of the 
majority of the population and opposition parties. The fact is that ‘being hard on 
crime’ has not been the traditional policy advocated throughout the Canadian 
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4.2 Opposition to the Act  
The first opposition comes from the Canadian Sentencing Commission. In its 1988 
Report, in addition to recommending the abolition of mandatory minimum sentence 
for all offences except murder and high treason, the Canadian Sentencing Commission 
recommended that the government of Canada adopt a system of presumptive 
guidelines that would be established by a permanent sentencing commission and 
confirmed by Parliament.149 Presumptive sentencing guidelines set a range of penalties 
for an offence, based on the seriousness of the offence and the defendant’s criminal 
history. The guidelines are presumptive in the sense that they set sentencing standards 
for individual cases that are presumed to be appropriate and that judges are expected 
to follow unless they document the reasons for departing from the norm.150 While 
judges are required to adhere to the guidelines, these also provide an opportunity for 
them to depart of prescribed minima.  
The elaboration of sentencing guidelines today could constitute a welcome alternative 
to mandatory minimum sentences, as it would respect the statutory principles and 
reintroduce the discretionary power of sentencing judges. Indeed, presumptive 
guidelines operate in a similar way to an escape clause, preserving the opportunity for 
judges to depart from prescribed minima when they can reasonably justify this in the 
circumstances of a case, thereby exercising their discretionary power. Such a 
requirement would definitely be less severe and more accessible than the two-levels 
requirement, developed by the Supreme Court, which is currently imposed on 
Canadian judges.151 
In addition, such guidelines could have been regularly reviewed by both the 
commission and Parliament and therefore would have constituted a more accurate and 
flexible alternative to statutory mandatory sentences. Moreover, these guidelines could 
have been elaborated on the basis of the principles which were later incorporated into 
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the Criminal Code,152 to ensure that these principles were not infringed during the 
sentencing process. 
 In the event, the Canadian Sentencing Commission recommendation was not 
followed because it was found that such guidelines would compromise the great 
discretionary power of sentencing judges who, at the time, were given complete 
responsibility for sentencing.  
The Canadian government has endorsed the same attitude and favoured the 
introduction of mandatory minimum sentences into the Safe Streets & Communities 
Act.  Despite wide-ranging concerns raised by opposition parties and various interest 
groups153 about the legislation, the Canadian government did not take into account the 
expressed recommendations. 
Among others, The Canadian Criminal Justice Association has unequivocally stated its 
opposition to the introduction of minimum sentences for certain sexual offences with 
respect to children as well as those related to drug offences:  
‘Under section a) of this proposed legislation, mandatory minimum penalties will be 
increased or imposed, and maximum penalties increased, for certain sexual offences with 
respect to children. The CCJA has historically taken an oppositional position on the issue 
of mandatory minimum penalties. In sum, criminologists have noted the danger that 
mandatory minimum sentences could lead to prison over-crowding, increased violence 
and lack of access to rehabilitative programming that accompanies over-crowding.’  
 
The CCJA continues:  
 
‘The amendments to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act which create mandatory 
minimum sentences for “serious” drug offences are, in the opinion of the CCJA unlikely 
to have a significant deterrent effect on the production and sale of illicit substances and 
are likely to create situations where the mandatory minimum sentence is disproportionate 
to the harm of the offence. Further, the use of mandatory minimum penalties (combined 
with the proposed restrictions on the use of conditional sentences) is likely to put a great 
deal of pressure on provincial correctional systems, which already face over-crowding 
and a lack of resources for rehabilitative measures. Further, mandatory minimum 
sentences allow no leniency for offenders who accept responsibility for their crime and 
plead guilty, thereby ensuring an increase in “not guilty” pleas and subsequent trials that 
are likely to pose a significant workflow problem for our court system. The backlogging 
of the court system also has implications for miscarriages of justice: According to 
Juristat, the average time to dispose of a criminal case in Canadian courts is already 124 
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days (Thomas 2010). Under the Charter, Canadians charged with an offence are 
guaranteed the right to be “tried within a reasonable amount of time”. Court backlogs due 
to increased numbers of trials risks creating a situation in which cases will be dropped 
because the system cannot process them within a “reasonable amount of time”.’154 
 
Regardless of opposition, this piece of legislation has been passed very recently and 
illustrates once again that the government’s agenda is not necessarily aligned with the 
codified principle of sentencing. 
Through the years, not only has opposition been raised but many alternatives to 
mandatory penalties have also been put forward. For example, Michael Tonry155 has 
made a number of suggestions about how the harm caused by mandatory minimum 
sentences could be minimised. He suggests, inter alia, adding ‘sunset’ provisions to 
mandatory penalty laws so that they would automatically be repealed unless re-
enacted by the legislature. A similar clause featured in the South African mandatory 
minimum Act,156 which was initially meant to be a temporary measure for twelve 
months. However, as will become apparent in Section 7.1 of this paper, Parliament 
repeatedly re-enacted the dispositions until it repealed the sunset clause in 2007, 
making the Act permanent.  
The introduction of an exemption clause, like the proposed introduction of 
presumptive guidelines as recommended by Canadian Sentencing Commission, would 
have been a means to preserve judicial discretion in the sentencing process. It would 
have allowed some flexibility for judges to take into account exceptional 
circumstances and choose not to sentence an offender to the presumptive minimum. 
At the very least, it would have allowed Parliament to enact mandatory and not 
presumptive minimum sentences for various offences, but would have provided for an 
‘escape clause’ for departure from the imposed of the mandatory minima. In many 
jurisdictions, judicial discretion is maintained by such a clause, which prevents some 
of the main problems in Canadian jurisdiction regarding mandatory penalties, such as 
avoiding injustices and respecting the principle of proportionality. South Africa is one 
such jurisdiction and the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’157 clause was 
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incorporated into its legislation in 1997. However, as will be demonstrated, while such 
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CHAPTER 5 
SENTENCING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1994 marked the start of a new democratic era in South Africa. Before that, the 
sentencing scene had been fairly constant. The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
included a wide range of possible punishments. Among them, imprisonment was 
commonly imposed for serious offences, and capital punishment remained available 
for the most heinous crimes even though a moratorium had prevented any execution 
since 1989.158  Limited to less serious offences, fines were the most commonly 
imposed punishment. Corporal punishment was also a widely imposed punishment for 
juvenile offenders. The Act remains applicable today and, together with common law 
principles, it constitutes the principal guidelines for sentencing.  
 
5.1 Sentencing guidelines 
The first framework provided by the South African legislature in the sentencing 
process is determined at the level of the trial court.159 Most sentences are still set out 
in the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and no court may impose a form of 
punishment other than that specifically provided for in legislation.160  
Many of the more serious South African offences are not contained in any statute, but 
are still common law offences.161 Likewise, many of the sentencing principles are not 
part of the written legislation, but rather common law principles. South Africa’s Law 
Commission proposed a sentencing framework162 based on a scheme of desert-
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160 S Terblanche & JV Roberts ‘Lacking in principle but delivering on justice?’ (2005) 18 S.A.J.C.J.    
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161 Such as murder, robbery, theft, fraud and assault, see Terblanche & Roberts op cit (n160) 191  
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oriented sentencing guidelines.163 However, the proposed Bill has never been before 
Parliament. 164  Hence the South African jurisdiction recognises its principles of 
sentencing as derived from the common law, as opposed to the Canadian jurisdiction 
where some general principles and purposes were explicitly incorporated into 
legislation in 1996.165  
In 1969, Zinn166 provided the first basic triad of sentencing considerations. These 
principles are still applied by the Courts today. This triad is based on ‘the nature of the 
offence, the personal circumstances of the appellant and the interests of the 
community’.167 At the time, the Court did not provide more specific guidance on 
which of the appellant’s personal circumstances should be taken into account or what 
constitutes the interests of the community. The only guidance put forward by judge 
Rumpff JA was that, in the sentencing process, each of these three factors must ‘[be] 
properly balanced with one another’.168  
The adoption of statutory, explicit, or at least more specific sentencing guidelines into 
South Africa’s legislation might have subsequently facilitated the interpretation of the 
exemption clause,169 which was subsequently adopted concerning the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentences. Indeed, as we will see under section 6.2 of this paper, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal further stipulated that the exemption clause must be 
interpreted in the light of ‘all the factors that would traditionally be relevant to 
sentencing’. 170  Considering that the common law principles contained in the 
sentencing triad have b en left to the courts’ interpretation, they do not provide much 
guidance when later invoked to interpret the law. 
 The stipulation of statutory sentencing guidelines faced one major difficulty: South 
African courts shared a tradition of judicial discretion in the sentencing process. 
Hence, courts do not like to see the exercise of this discretion fettered, whether by the 
adoption of strict sentencing guidelines or by the imposition of mandatory sentences.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 A von Hirsch & A Ashworth ‘Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles’ (2005) Oxford  
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5.2 Sentencing principle: a wide discretionary power for judges 
Similarly to Canada, the perception of the judicial function in the South African 
sentencing context was that it had to include the exercise of a wide, if not quasi-
unfettered, sentencing discretion. This discretionary power has long been recognised 
as a prerogative for sentencing judges: ‘The infliction of punishment is pre-eminently 
a matter for the discretion of the trial Court. It can better appreciate the atmosphere of 
the case and can better estimate the circumstances of the locality and the need for a 
heavy or light sentence than the appellate tribunal’.171  
As in other countries where sentencing judges have a wide discretion to impose 
sentences, the general purposes of sentencing have been used to depart from a 
predetermined mandatory sentence and to justify a different, more appropriate 
sentence in the circumstances. These purposes, inherited from the common law, have 
been recognised and applied by South African judges: 
‘In the assessment of an appropriate sentence, regard must be had inter alia to the main 
purposes of punishment mentioned by DAVIS AJA in R v. Swanepoel, 1945 AD 444 at 
455, namely, deterrent, preventive, reformative and retributive, (See S v. Whitehead, 
1970(4) SA 424(A) at436E-F; S v. Rabie, 1975(4)SA855(A)at862).’ 172 
 
The imposition of mandatory sentences, which apparently contradict this discretion, 
has been highly criticised, based on pragmatic arguments as well as constitutional 
principles.173 In the mid-1970s, Mr Justice Viljoen, then president of The Commission 
of Inquiry into the Penal System,174 helped develop the pragmatic argument that 
judges hold a unique position and are the most suited to impose appropriate sentences. 
As in Canada, it is in the context of drug related offences that the imposition of 
mandatory sentences was first criticised.175 At the time, the South African Constitution 
did not provide for the accused’s right against cruel and unusual punishment. Mr 
Justice Viljoen was thus unable to use the argument, put forward by the Supreme 
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Court of Canada,176 that a mandatory minimum sentence in this context would 
constitute the violation of this right. Nevertheless, he firmly rejected the imposition of 
mandatory minimum sentences, basing his argument on the appreciation of the general 
purposes of sentencing: he suggested that using deterrent sentences to stamp out the 
use of drugs was ‘from a retributive point of view, outrageously unreasonable’.177 
The second argument put forward in favour of judicial sentencing discretion in South 
Africa relied on the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. This argument 
gained prominence from the 1960s onwards as the Government sought to criminalise 
severely any form of political resistance to its authority.178 The primary pragmatic 
argument for judicial independence was consequently backed by political opposing 
groups, which maintained that judges were not only in a unique position to select the 
appropriate sentence, but were constitutionally required to do so.179 Judges strongly 
supported this line of thought, and it is in the context of political cases180 that the 
imposition of mandatory sentences sparked the most controversy. 
At the dawn of democracy, South Africa adopted an interim version of a new 
Constitution,181 which guaranteed the independence of the judiciary and included a 
justiciable Bill of Rights.182 This progressive constitutional framework, based on 
existing foreign constitutions, was promising for the country. Indeed, unlike other 
constitutions that celebrate long-standing tradition and endorse the past,183 the new 
Constitution focuses on law as a vehicle for change. Its preamble clearly shows that 
the intention was to move away from the past:  
We, the people of South Africa, 
Recognise the injustices of our past;  
[…] We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as 
the supreme law of the Republic so as to  
• Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
• Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
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• Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; 
and 
• Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations. […] 
 
The final version of the Constitution184 was approved by the Constitutional Court 
(CC) on 4 December 1996 and took effect on 4 February 1997. Adding to the newly 
established democracy, the Constitution appeared to have strengthened the power and 
independence of the judiciary: it provided for a Constitutional Court with final 
jurisdiction on constitutional matters and explicitly replaced the sovereignty of 
Parliament by the supremacy of the Constitution. Hence, this legislation indicated that 
the intention in 1996 was for the courts to be given more, rather than less, power. 
Accordingly, the discretionary power of sentencing judges should have been 
bolstered, as they were already perceived as requiring wide discretion in the exercise 
of their power.  
While the new Constitution strengthened judicial independence, its Bill of Rights also 
appeared to be a tool used against the imposition of mandatory sentencing.  
 
5.3 Makwanyane and its backlash   
As we have seen, South Africa has adopted a system of Constitutional Supremacy 
with judicial review. This gives the courts powers to decide matters which are on the 
legislative agenda. Moreover, in a constitutional democracy, courts are the primary 
protectors and final arbiters of constitutional rights.185  
The pairing of the new South African Constitution with a Bill of Rights gave the 
newly established Constitutional Court tools to address statutory mandatory penalties.  
The first time the Court relied on the Bill of Rights to attack the validity of sentencing 
legislation was in the context of capital punishment. In 1995, in S v. Makwanyane,186 
the Constitutional Court adopted the same logic as the Supreme Court of Canada187 to 
conclude that the sentence to be imposed would have infringed the constitutional 
rights of the accused and was, therefore, unconstitutional.   
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In this case, the two accused were convicted on four counts of murder, one count of 
attempted murder and one count of robbery with aggravating circumstances. They 
were sentenced to death on each of the counts of murder and to long terms of 
imprisonment on the other counts.188 Although capital punishment was not mandatory, 
it was at the time a competent sentence for the crime of murder under s277(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.189 However, the death penalty was inconsistent with  
s11(2) of the South African Constitution,190 which offers protection against cruel,  
inhuman, or degrading punishment. Consequently, one of the effects of the Court 
judgment was to prohibit the State, or any of its organs, from executing persons whose 
appeals against death sentences had been disposed of 191 and, subsequently, prohibited 
the imposition of death penalty.  
In common with the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of 
Smith,192 which concluded that a mandatory sentence of seven years’ imprisonment 
for importing narcotics constituted a violation of the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment, 193  the South African Constitutional Court agreed that 
‘proportionality is an ingredient to be taken into account in deciding whether a penalty 
is cruel, inhuman or degrading.’194 The Court thus acknowledged that proportionality 
in sentencing was a principle recognised under the Constitution: 
‘Proportionality is an ingredient to be taken into account in deciding whether a penalty is 
cruel, inhuman or degrading.  […] Disparity between the crime and the penalty is not the 
only ingredient of proportionality; factors such as the enormity and irredeemable 
character of the death sentence in circumstances where neither error nor arbitrariness can 
be excluded, the expense and difficulty of addressing the disparities which exist in 
practice between accused persons facing similar charges, and which are due to factors 
such as race, poverty, and ignorance, and the other subjective factors which have been 
mentioned, are also factors that can and should be taken into account in dealing with this 
issue. It may possibly be that none alone would be sufficient under our Constitution to 
justify a finding that the death sentence is cruel, inhuman or degrading. But these factors 
are not to be evaluated in isolation. They must be taken together, and in order to decide 
whether the threshold set by section 11(2) has been crossed they must be evaluated with 
other relevant factors, including the two fundamental rights on which the accused rely, 
the right to dignity and the right to life.’195 
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As we have seen, the application of constitutional rights in challenging sentencing law 
was first put forward in the context of capital punishment. However, in the year after  
Makwanyane,196 the concept of proportionality, which the Constitutional Court defines 
as the balance between the sentence to be imposed and the fundamental rights 
involved, was applied in the context of minimum mandatory sentencing by a 
Namibian High Court. 197  The Namibian Court applied the same principle of 
proportionality in sentencing as had been developed and applied in the Smith198 case in 
Canada. It held that it was unconstitutional to impose the prescribed mandatory 
sentence for the offence of stock theft, as that was not proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offence and provided an outcome that was ‘shocking’ in the circumstances. 
Here, again, the existence of a constitution and the rights that it entails have proved to 
be efficient tools to ensure the maintenance of the principle of proportionality in 
sentencing, safeguarded by respect for the fundamental rights of the accused. 
The South African Constitution enacted in 1996 had the effect of reinforcing judicial 
primacy in sentencing, which was already established by a long line of scholarship. 
Following other jurisdictions, the Constitutional Court found in the Constitution a 
justification for the promotion of fundamental rights and for the reframing of certain 
principles of sentencing, such as proportionality. As a result, the first applications of 
the Constitution by the South African courts could have led to an expectation that 
mandatory minimum sentences were about to disappear from the South African 
sentencing scene. However, critics against judicial primacy rapidly emerged and 
public opinion became hostile towards disparities in sentencing. A remedy was sought 
in the creation of a legislative standard that would affect the exercise of the sentencing 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ACT 105 OF 1997: ‘SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING 
CIRCUMSTANCES’ 
 
6.1 The background to the Act and judicial dissatisfaction  
The advent of a constitutional democracy in South Africa was in fact meant to define a 
new society, based on substantive equality.201 Writing in the South African Journal of 
Human Rights in 1998, Albertyn and Goldblatt make the point that the movement of 
change will: 
‘require a complete reconstruction of the state and society, including a redistribution of 
power and resources along egalitarian lines.  The challenge of achieving equality within 
this transformation project involves the eradication of systemic forms of domination and 
material disadvantage based on race, gender, class and other grounds of inequality.  It 
also entails the development of opportunities, which allow people to realise their full 
human potential within positive social relationships.’202 
 
Hence the transformation agenda operating in South Africa was a social and economic 
revolution, occurring in the context of a country having to contend with unequal and 
insufficient access to housing, food, water, healthcare and electricity.203 Despite the 
advent of a Constitution providing a new set of rights, equality is far from having been 
achieved and the societal revolution has left the country struggling with a high level of 
crime. As former Chief Justice Chaskalson has written: ‘[F]or as long as these 
conditions continue to exist that aspiration [that is, of substantive equality] will have a 
hollow ring.’204  
 
To address this upsurge in crime, the introduction of new sentencing legislation was 
seen as necessary. On 1 May 1998, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 205 
came into operation, re-introducing minimum sentencing in South Africa.   
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Some argue that the Act was designed to bring the law into line with the 
Constitutional Court’s findings in Makwanyane 206  and the rise in popular 
punitiveness, given that public sympathy was against the abolition of the death 
penalty.207  Indeed, the Van Den Heever Committee208 found that the need for new 
legislation responded in part to a call from the community for heavier penalties and 
for offenders to serve a more realistic term of imprisonment. Public dissatisfaction 
with the crime situation and sentencing was reflected in various newspaper reports.209 
 
The South African Law Commission saw the introduction of the new Act as an effort 
to remedy increasing crime rates and decrease sentencing disparities. Basing its 
argument on the punishment objectives, the Commission encouraged the re-
introduction of mandatory minimum sentencing for specified serious offences. Prior to 
1997, punishment objectives primarily included deterrence, incapacitation, 
reformation and retribution.210 However, in its 1997 report, the Commission found 
that while retributive notions211 of justice remained important, objectives such as 
deterrence, denunciation of blameworthy behaviour, redress of harm, and 
rehabilitation had begun to overshadow retributive concerns.212 
Consequently, besides the notion of retribution, deterrence and the need for 
consistency were suggested as possible purposes for the Act. Minimum sentence 
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provisions have often been put forward as an effective deterrent. For instance, a study 
by Wicharaya213 examined the effects of harsh sentencing policies across forty-five 
American states from 1959 to 1987. These policies generally fall into the category of 
‘get tough on crime’214 and include regimes such as mandatory minimum sentences. 
The premise of most of these reforms was to make prison sentences more certain or 
longer. Wicharaya noted that: 
‘because they typically came into force as a result of high-profile political processes and 
appear – at least on the surface – to meet the criteria of increasing the perception that 
harsh sentences would flow from a conviction for one of the relevant offenses, they can 
be seen as forming a reasonable basis for expecting deterrence effects.’215   
 
The intention behind the South African legislation was no exception: the legislature’s 
aim in adopting the Act was to reduce the number of serious crimes through general 
deterrence. Judges endorsed this stance as illustrated in S v Malgas,216 where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal declared: ‘In short, the Legislature aimed at ensuring a 
severe, standardised, and consistent response from the courts to the commission of 
such [serious] crimes…’ 
Another purpose of the Act, the need for consistency, originated from the fact that 
judges had a quasi-unfettered discretion to determine sentences, which led to blatant 
discrimination: ‘[L]ike cases [were] not being treated alike because there [was] unfair 
discrimination against some offenders on grounds of race and social status in 
particular.’217 For example, sentences imposed by white judges on white accused were 
widely criticised in the media for being more lenient than those imposed on black 
accused, and open accusations of racial bias were made.218 
In due course, the first draft of the Act was formally tabled in Parliament on 9 June 
1997, under the Criminal Law Amendment Bill.219 Although it provided for the re-
introduction of minimum sentences, the Bill innovated in setting up a system that 
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would allow judges to depart from the mandatory provisions. The Bill contained a 
provision allowing a court to impose lighter sentences than the prescribed minima if, 
in its opinion, there were ‘circumstances’ that would justify these lighter sentences.220 
All the court was required to do was to record what these ‘circumstances’ were and 
that would, in theory, maintain the discretion of the sentencing court. 
If the Bill had been adopted in its final version with a ‘circumstances’ clause, that 
would have safeguarded the judicial discretion of sentencing judges, which was, as we 
have seen, a sacred component of South African judicial history. However, Parliament 
reviewed the Bill, modified the exemption clause and imposed a greater burden on 
judges for departures from prescribed minima. This modification was made without 
the agreement of the judiciary, which never felt adequately consulted by the executive 
during the drafting of the Act as commented by Chief Justice Corbett in S v Toms; S v 
Bruce: 
 ‘... the imposition of a mandatory minimum prison sentence has always been regarded as 
an undesirable intrusion by the Legislature upon the jurisdiction of the courts to 
determine the punishment to be meted out to persons convicted of statutory offences and 
as a kind of enactment that is calculated in certain instances to produce grave 
injustice.’221 
 
The final version of the Act of 1997 appeared harsher than its draft Bill. The changes 
that were made included: the introduction of a subsection that prescribes that 
mandatory minimum sentences cannot be suspended;222 the extension of the list of 
offences for which minimum sentences would be imposed; and the addition of a 
mandatory life sentence for the most serious crimes.223 But one of the greatest changes 
involved new conditions that must be met before a court can depart from prescribed 
minima. From simply ‘circumstances’ that judges needed to record under the Bill, the 
Act now requires the finding of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’224 before a 
departure can be allowed. The legislative history of these words ‘substantial and 
compelling’, which are not usual juridical terms in South Africa, is somewhat 
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obscure225 and has left courts with interpretation problems and inconsistencies in the  
application of the clause. 
The core of mandatory minimum sentencing is laid out in s51 and Part 1 of Schedule 2 
of the Act.226 As the re-introduction of mandatory minima was seen as an emergency 
measure that would apply for a period of two years, there was common accord that the 
uncertainties regarding some of these provisions, such as the ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’, did not need to be dealt with immediately.  Although the 
Act came into force on 1 May 1998, it took some time for the effects of mandatory 
penalties to be felt, as they only applied to crimes committed after that date.227 There 
was a delay before the various divisions of the High Court were called upon to 
interpret the provisions of the Act, and a further delay in the reporting of relevant 
judgments.228 By the second half of 1999 judgments started to appear regularly in the 
law reports.  
Between 1998 and 2001, Parliament kept extending the term of the Act without 
providing any further legislative guidance, leaving the courts with disparate 
interpretations and applications of the exemption clause.229 It was only in 2001 that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) examined the issue and provided some guidance 
regarding the interpretation of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’.  
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6.2 ‘Substantial and compelling circumstances’: guidance from the Supreme 
Court of Appeal 
R v Malgas230 was a benchmark judgment in the interpretation of the exception clause 
and the effort to address the ‘judicial hostility to legislative prescriptions which strip 
courts of their sentencing discretion’.231  In this instance, the appellant, a 22-year-old 
woman, was convicted of murder by the High Court and sentenced to imprisonment 
for life.232  The Supreme Court of Appeal stressed that ‘the specified sentences should 
not be departed from lightly’233 and that prescribed sentences should ordinarily be 
imposed. Nonetheless, the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause allows 
judges to depart from the Act if they are convinced that the prescribed sentence would 
be disproportionate or amount to an injustice.234 In order to determine if a departure is 
called for, the Supreme Court of Appeal expressly rejected earlier decisions which 
ruled that individual circumstances must each be substantial and compelling. Instead, 
the Court stated that courts should weight up the cumulative impact of all the factors 
which would traditionally be relevant to sentencing.235  
The conclusions in Malgas236 were reiterated in a recent decision, in which it was 
found that ‘courts are obliged to impose those sentences unless there are truly 
convincing reasons for departing from them’.237 In Matyityi,238 three accused were 
indicted on one charge each of murder and rape and two charges of robbery for 
separate events that had occurred in April 2008.239 At the commencement of the trial 
before the Eastern Cape High Court, Matyityi, unlike his co-accused, expressed a 
willingness to tender a plea of guilty to all of the charges. After the trials he was 
separately convicted on his guilty plea. He was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment 
on each of the murder and rape charges, and to 13 years' imprisonment in respect of 
each of the robbery counts, to run concurrently with the first sentence.240 
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In the first instance, Matiwana AJ identified 'substantial and compelling 
circumstances’ to justify a departure from the prescribed sentences of life 
imprisonment laid down by the legislature for each of the murder and rape 
convictions.241 The judge concluded: 'As I have stated, in my mind, the court should 
not impose the prescribed minimum sentence in [this] case, in view of the accused's 
age, and in the light of the remorse displayed by him during the trial here.'242 
During the appeal against this sentence by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised that public interest that should not be forsaken 
for the personal characteristics of the accused when issuing a sentence. Examining the 
evidence of remorse and the age of the accused as ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’, the Court found that these factors were not sufficient to justify a 
departure from the statutory penalties and concluded that:  ‘Being so motivated, it 
would seem that [the judge] overemphasised the interests of the respondent at the 
expense of the public interest in a just and proportionally balanced sentence’.  
Yet the Supreme Court of Appeal underlines that the principle of public interest, 
which is a component that judges must take into account in determining of an 
appropriate sentence, is a criterion that should also be taken into account in the 
assessment of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’. No better definition or 
guidance of public interest had been developed by the courts than the one left by the 
triad243 which suggested that, on the one hand, there were society’s interests and, on 
the other, the offender’s interests. Although it could be argued that society’s interests 
are reconcilable with the interests of the accused, as the High Court would itself do at 
a later date,244 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Matyityi245 was simply relying on the 
sentencing guidelines set out by precedents to offer more guidance on the application 
of the exemption clause.   
Since it entered into force, the interpretation and application of the Act, and 
specifically of its s51(1), have led to inconsistencies. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
has offered the guidance that the prescribed sentence should normally be imposed, but 
the law allows a departure from it when it would be disproportionate to the crime or 
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amount to an injustice. The Court further established that it is the cumulative effect of 
all the factors normally taken into consideration in the sentencing process that serve to 
determine ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ and that consideration of the 
public interest is key to a just and proportionally balanced sentence. However, this 
provides very little guidance and many problems remain. The Act was an attempt to 
introduce a measure of conformity into the sentencing process and should not have 
been regarded as introducing a major change in the approach to sentencing.246  If the 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause safeguarded the constitutionality of 
the Act when challenged before the Constitutional Court, this has not prevented the 
courts from using it as grounds for deviating from the imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentences.247 
 
6.3 Courts’ interpretations of the vagueness of the law  
If the exception clause has been criticised due to its lack of guidance and precision, it 
is this very vagueness regarding which circumstances would allow a judge to depart 
from the minimum sentences which has maintained the validity of the Act when it has 
been constitutionally challenged. Constitutional issues regarding the Act have been 
raised twice, and in both cases the Constitutional Court (CC) decided not to confirm 
the order of invalidity made by high courts. In the first case, the question before of the 
court did not concern the exception clause, but rather the split procedure created by 
s52 of the Act.248 In the second case, the Act’s validity was constitutionally challenged 
on two grounds. First, the High Court found that the imposition of a prescribed 
sentence was a limitation of the fair trial envisaged by s35(3)(c) of the Constitution, 
which guaranteed every person ‘a public trial before an ordinary court’. The 
Constitutional Court did not endorse this argument and rather concluded that both the 
Legislature and the Executive had a legitimate interest, role and duty with regard to 
the imposition and subsequent administration of penal sentences.249 The existence of 
an exception clause permitting the imposition of a lesser sentence than the one 
prescribed ensured that the ‘separation of powers’ principle was not infringed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 South Africa Law Commission op cit (n217) 12 
247 South Africa Law Commission op cit (n217) 10-19 
248  According to s52 an accused convicted by the Regional Court had to be sentenced by the High  
      Court for the commission of certain crimes. See S v Dzukuda; S v Tilly; S v Tshilo 2000 (3) SA 229     
     (W) 










	   51 
Therefore the Act did not transgress the Bill of Rights’ check on the Legislature, does 
not infringe the separation of powers principle and preserves the accused’s right to a 
fair trial.250 
The second argument put forward was that the imposition of the prescribed minimum 
sentence constituted a violation of the fundamental right to not be subject to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment under s12(1)(e) of the Constitution. In its decision, 
the Constitutional Court concurred with the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Smith251 and Latimer,252 and recognised that gross disproportionality between the 
sentence and the crime for which it is imposed could constitute a violation of this 
right: 
‘In Canada the issue is dealt with on the basis of whether the statutory provision enacting 
the mandatory minimum sentence unjustifiably infringes the right guaranteed by section 
12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms “not to be subjected to any cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment.”4[3] The criterion which is applied to determine whether 
a mandatory minimum punishment is cruel and unusual is “whether the punishment 
prescribed is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency;” the “effect of that 
punishment must not be grossly disproportionate to what would have been 
appropriate.”[4]’253 
 
However, the Constitutional Court found that the exemption clause included in the Act 
was a legislative safeguard that will ensure that the right of an offender under 
s12(1)(e) of the Constitution will not be infringed:  
‘The whole approach enunciated in Malgas, and in particular the determinative test 
articulated in paragraph I of the summary, namely […] makes plain that the power of the 
court to impose a lesser sentence than that prescribed can be exercised well before the 
disproportionality between the mandated sentence and the nature of the offence becomes 
so great that it can be typified as gross. Thus the sentencing court is not obliged to impose 
a sentence which would limit the offender’s section 12(1)(e) right. Accordingly section 
51(1) does not compel the court to act inconsistently with the Constitution.’254 
 
The Constitutional Court not only referred to Malgas 255  as constituting the 
‘determinative test’ for departure from the prescribed sentence, but also stated that it is 
this ‘test’, or the possibility for courts to apply ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’, that maintains the constitutional validity of the Act. Even though the 
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Court found that the exemption clause would ensure that no ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
sentence would be applied, it has not provided more specific guidance or determined 
any criteria for identifying what constitutes ‘substantial and compelling 
circumstances’.  Hence the interpretation of the exemption clause is still largely in the 
hands of sentencing courts, which have decided that the exception should become the 
rule in the case of rape. 
In the wake of the Constitutional Court’s decision in Dodo256 and the Supreme Court 
of appeal’s decision in Malgas, 257  courts have constructed a hybrid sentencing 
scheme 258  for departures from the legislative-prescribed sentences. This hybrid 
scheme aims at compliance with the two afore-mentioned appellate decisions. The 
result is a lesser sentence for the accused based on factors related to the gravity of the 
crime as opposed to the offender or victim. In the long-term, this has created a 
sentencing scheme that misuses valid reasons for a departure from the mandatory 
minimums and has allowed the development of a rape jurisprudence that minimises 
the inherent violence of rape.  
Thus, in the case of rape, the Supreme Court of Appeal has established a new 
benchmark,259 to which the imposition of the prescribed sentences is an exception. 
The minimum sentences Act prescribes the imposition of life imprisonment when the 
offence of rape is repeated more than once.260 Under s51(3)(aA), the Act also provides 
particular guidance: ‘[W]hen imposing a sentence in respect of the offence of rape [the 
following] shall not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances justifying the 
imposition of a lesser sentence.’261 
 In the case S v Mahomotsa,262 even with this legislative specification and the presence 
of specified aggravating factors, the Supreme Court of Appeal departed from the 
imposition of the ultimate sentence provided for by the Act. In convicting the accused, 
the regional magistrate found as a fact that he had had non-consensual sex with each 
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of the two complainants more than once.263 Referred to the High Court, the accused 
was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on the first and ten years’ imprisonment on 
the second count, with these sentences running concurrently.264 In imposing the 
sentence, Kotze J considered the mitigating and aggravating features in the case. 
These were, according to him:   
‘that the accused was relatively young and had already spent eight months in prison at the 
time of sentencing; that the complainants sustained no physical injuries and had suffered 
no psychological damage as a result of the rapes, and that they had not lost their virginity 
from the rapes as they had already been sexually active, one of them having had sexual 
intercourse two days before she was raped by the accused. The aggravating features were 
that the accused had a relevant previous conviction of having had sexual intercourse, in 
1994, with a girl of less than 16 years of age and for which he was sentenced to five 
strokes with a light cane; that he committed the second offence while he was awaiting 
trial on the first count – he had been released in the custody of his grandmother – and that 
he had lied about his age in court (he had said that he was 17 years old while he was in 
fact 23) in order to secure a light sentence.’265 
 
At appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal reviewed these factors to conclude that the 
court a quo misdirected itself in its assessment of substantial and compelling 
circumstances.266 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment should not be imposed in this instance. It relied on two tests to justify 
its decision. First, the Court established that the rapes concerned, though serious, 
‘cannot be classified as falling within the worst category of rape’267. Hence, based on 
a logic of proportionality, the Court explained that: 
‘One must of course guard against the notion that because still more serious cases than 
the one under consideration are imaginable, it must follow inexorably that something 
should be kept in reserve for such cases and therefore that the sentence imposed in the 
case at hand should be correspondingly lighter than the severer sentences that such 
hypothetical cases would merit. There is always an upper limit in all sentencing 
jurisdictions, be it death, life or some lengthy term of imprisonment, and there will 
always be cases which, although differing in their respective degrees of seriousness, none 
the less all call for the maximum penalty imposable. The fact that the crimes under 
consideration are not all equally horrendous may not matter if the least horrendous of 
them is horrendous enough to justify the imposition of the maximum penalty.’268 
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 Secondly, taking into account the mitigating factors related to the first count, the 
Court found that the prescribed life imprisonment ‘would be disproportionate to the 
crime, the criminal and the legitimate interests of society […]’.269 What is interesting 
to note is that even though the Court determined that ‘the same cannot be said without 
more about the second count’,270 it pointed out that it was unable to alter the 
legislation on which it had to base its decision: 
 
‘[A]t the time of the second rape, the accused had not as yet been convicted on the first 
count. Again this is of course no excuse. But the Legislature has itself distinguished him 
from persons who, having been convicted of two or more offences of rape but not yet 
sentenced, commits yet another rape. If, for example, the accused in the first instance had 
not raped the first complainant more than once and he then in the second instance raped 
the second complainant only once while awaiting trial on the first count the prescribed 
sentence of life imprisonment would not have come into the reckoning.’271 
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeal imposed a revised sentence of eight 
years’ imprisonment on the first count and 12 years’ imprisonment on the second 
count, to be served cumulatively.272 
To decide on the appropriate sentence to be imposed in the case of Mahomotsa,273 the 
Court referred to the decision that it had made the same year in Abrahams 274 where, 
on the appeal by the State against a seven-year sentence, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
increased the sentence of a father convicted for the rape of his 14-year-old daughter to 
12 years’ imprisonment. This decision has had a significant impact on the 
interpretation of the minimum sentences Act. The Court referred to the Sentencing Act 
as ‘a legislative standard that weighs upon the exercise of the sentencing court’s 
discretion. This entails sentences for the scheduled crimes that are consistently heavier 
than before.’275 However, although the Court found that the sentence imposed by the 
court a quo was too lenient, it refused to impose the sentence of life imprisonment 
prescribed by the Sentencing Act.  
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The Supreme Court of Appeal recognised that, when a court is asked to determine an 
appropriate sentence, ‘due regard must [therefore] be paid to what the Legislature has 
set as the ‘benchmark’,	  even when substantial and compelling circumstances are found 
to exist’.276 Nevertheless, a sentence should always be imposed in accordance with the 
principles enunciated by the Constitutional Court,277 which ensure that courts will not 
impose disproportionate and unjust sentences, even if prescribed by the legislature. 
Once again, the Supreme Court of Appeal applied the logic of proportionality to 
conclude that the ‘worst sentence’ should be reserved for the ‘worst crime’: 
‘But it does weigh further toward the conclusion that a sentence of life imprisonment 
would be unjust.  In addition, I agree with Foxcroft J that this is not one of the worst 
cases of rape.  This is not to say that rape can ever be condoned.  But some rapes are 
worse than others, and the life sentence ordained by the Legislature should be reserved 
for cases devoid of substantial factors compelling the conclusion that such a sentence is 
inappropriate and unjust.’278   
 
Since these decisions from the Supreme Court of Appeal, the application of 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ in the case of rape is no longer the 
exception, but the norm. The sentence of life imprisonment laid down in the Act is 
now reserved for the ‘worst cases of rape’, which result in the prescribed sentences not 
normally being imposed.279 Even when a case involves specified factors enunciated in 
the Act as not constituting substantial and compelling circumstances,280 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal still refuses to impose the prescribed sentence if it concludes that the 
given rape is not ‘the worst’ there is. 281 
Thus, if the Supreme Court of Appeal previously established that a slight discrepancy 
between a prescribed minimum sentence and what would constitute a ‘proportionate’ 
sentence was not enough to justify a departure, it is still not clear how much more it 
takes to reach this ‘justification’. In the case of rape, for example, this justification is 
easily found when the crime is not ‘one of the worst cases of rape’. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the fact that the exemption clause makes it possible to not 
impose a prescribed minimum sentence ensures that the Act will not infringe an 
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accused’s fundamental rights. However, the same clause leads to the imposition of 
incoherent sentences for similar cases, and could therefore equally be seen as 
detrimental to an accused’s rights.282 Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal ruled against the imposition of mandatory life imprisonment in the case of 
repeated rape despite the fact that such a sentence is provided for in the Act highlights 
the weakness of the Act and raises serious doubts on its merits.  
In theory, the Act was meant to provide a strict sentencing scheme that would protect 
South African citizens and values.283 In practice, it appears that the Act of 1997 has 
not achieved its goals.    
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CHAPTER 7 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
 
7.1 Pitfalls of mandatory minimum sentences in South Africa 
In 2007, Parliament introduced the Criminal Law Sentencing Amendment Bill,284 
which attempted to address some of the unintended consequences of the Act. Amongst 
other changes, it removed s53, so that the President no longer needs to reconsider 
extending the legislation on a bi-annual basis.285 The removal of the sunset clause 
therefore means that the Act is now permanent and remains in force indefinitely. 
Although some people argue that the government is still committed to restructuring 
and transforming sentencing, and that these moves should not be seen as a decision to 
make minimum sentences a permanent feature of the criminal justice system,286 the 
2007 Bill has not undergone substantial legislative change. To date, the mandatory 
minimum sentencing regime in place has as yet failed to adequately address 
sentencing problems in South Africa satisfactorily and the Act does not appear to 
provide a sustainable future for sentencing development.287 
 
One of the first issues of the general sentencing regime established by the Act 
illustrates the fact it has not met its goals and purposes. Roth288 suggests that this 
failure should be attributed to the Parliament, which did not adequately consider the 
proposals set forth by the South African Reform Commission in its Issue Paper 11.289  
By not addressing these recommendations, as it should have done, Parliament has 
created a sentencing regime that does not further the expressed aims of South African 
punishment or address the sentencing disparities which had originally prompted the 
Act.290 Roth bases his argument on research291 examining the effects of the Act, and 
suggests that s51’s mandatory minimums have not achieved South Africa’s sentencing 
goals. His findings demonstrate that crime has risen, and not declined, since the 
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introduction of this legislation;292 sentencing inconsistency still pervades the South 
African judicial system;293 and satisfaction with the criminal justice system remains 
low.294 
 
Terblanche295 shares the view that the Act of 1997 has not met any of its purposes. He 
bases his argument on the Viljoen Commission’s conclusion, highlighting that 
‘minimum sentences gave no room for the balancing effect of retribution, that these 
sentences increased the prison population substantially, and yet produced no 
observable reduction in crime rates.’296 One of his main criticisms is that the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act297 does not result in retribution, as understood in the sense of 
‘just deserts’ or ‘proportionality’.298 He illustrates his point with the example of rape 
as described above and the new benchmark established by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal299 for this category of crime. The Court, calling for prescribed minima as an 
exception reserved for the worst cases of repeat-offence rape, proposes an 
interpretation coherent with the retributive theory.300 However, as we have seen, this 
interpretation does not follow the legislator’s intention behind the Act and therefore 
highlights the incongruence between the Act and the retributive theory. 
 
Another difficulty with the Act of 1997 was the procedural aspect. The Act defined 
the respective jurisdictions of the High Court and Regional Court regarding its 
application.301 The requirement that all murder and rape cases that fell within the 
ambit of s51(1) had to be committed to the High Court, as the only court that can 
impose life imprisonment,302 meant that the High Court had to review the transcription 
of all trials before the Regional Court can impose a sentence for a case conducted in 
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front of this instance, as it had to be satisfied that the conviction was regular before it 
could find the accused guilty again.303 Due to this jurisdiction restriction for the 
application of the Act, High Courts were soon completely overloaded. However, the 
Amendment Act of 2007 has addressed this issue and simplified the procedure which 
had given rise to a massive increase in the number of sentences that had to be imposed 
in the High Courts. In this amended version, the Act has ‘repeal[ed] all sections 
dealing with the committal of an accused for the purposes of sentencing by a High 
Court after conviction in a regional court of an offence referred to in Schedule 2.’304 
 
Despite the fact that this amendment has facilitated proceedings before the High 
Court, the mandatory minimum sentencing regime remains problematic as it entails 
increasingly cumbersome and costly procedures in the courts. Lengthy detentions and 
trials mean that justice is delayed, to the extent that questions of constitutionality will 
continue to arise in a context of generally worsening prison conditions.305 Beyond the 
procedural difficulties of the Act, a major issue remains within its core disposition.  
 
7.2 An exemption clause that leads to consistencies 
On a more specific level, criticisms have been levelled against the ‘substantial and 
compelling’ clause. Terblanche306 shares the opinion that the Act had little chance of 
achieving greater consistency in sentencing. If the intention behind the introduction of 
prescribed minima was to avoid disparities in sentencing, the exemption clause which 
allows for departure should have provided more guidance for judges. But the 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ are ill-defined and leave too much leeway 
for interpretation. The courts’ practice has therefore resulted in the misuse of the 
subjectivity severity of the crime as a mitigating factor.307 As courts continue to create 
case law based on subverting legislation, a wealth of unintended consequences have 
arisen when applying ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’. Consequently, the 
exemption clause fails to offer proper remedy to disparities, despite the parameters 
elaborated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 2001.308 With the Court’s new 
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guidance, the test to depart from prescribed minima is similar to the one elaborated by 
the Supreme Court of Canada309 which is, in theory, difficult to meet. However, even 
these parameters have not proven to provide sufficient consistency, which remain a 
problem for the application of prescribed penalties.  
 
Ironically, it is because the courts have been defending the exemption clause as a way 
to ‘apply the legislation in a constitutional manner’310 that the Act has survived 
constitutional challenge. However, as described under section 6.3 of this paper, the 
courts’ application actually diverts the Act from Parliament’s original intention. This 
dichotomy between, on the one hand, the Act and the Parliament intention for it and, 
on the other, the courts arguing constitutional rights to promote their judicial 
independence, is far from encouraging consistency within the South African 
sentencing regime.   
  
Finally, the burden that the Act imposes on judges to justify ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’ for departure from prescribed sentences can negatively 
influence the public opinion. It also reflects how the legislation has placed the 
judiciary at a disadvantage. Van Zyl Smit311 illustrates this point with the case of S v 
Jansen312 and the public criticism to which it has given rise. In this case, the accused, 
aged 26, was convicted of raping a 9-year-old girl on the state’s acceptance of his plea 
of guilty. Judge Davis found ‘substantial and compelling’ reasons to impose a 
sentence of eighteen y ars’ imprisonment instead of the prescribed mandatory life 
sentence. This sentence, which represented a heavy sentence313 by the standards that 
applied prior to the enactment of the Act, was subject to severe public criticism.314 
Van Zyl Smit argues that prior to the Act, a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment 
in a case like this would have drawn widespread public approval. However, to impose 
the same sentence under the new legislation, judges have to explain why the crime is 
less serious in relative terms. S v Jansen was rendered in 1999, not long after the 
adoption of the Act. Since then, we have seen that departures from the prescribed 
sentence have become common practice in cases of rape. However, the same problem 
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is encountered each time that judges consider that a departure from statutory minima 
is required in the circumstances: they have to justify why the crime at the bar is 
relatively less serious. In doing so, the risk is that the public will perceive them as 
being soft on crime, a perception which the political proponents of mandatory 
sentences can use to further their argument that such prescribed sentences are 
necessary because judges are too lenient and out of touch.315 
 
7.3 Judicial legacy, legal cultures and socio-political values 
One of the main arguments put forward to promote the introduction of mandatory 
penalties in both the Canadian and the South African jurisdictions has been the need to 
provide greater consistency in sentencing. In the case of South Africa, disparities were 
mainly due to race and social cleavage. Critics denounced the fact that, in court, ‘cases 
were not being treated alike because there was unfair discrimination against some 
offenders on grounds of race and social status in particular’.316   
 
In Canada, the need for consistency was mainly attributed to the construction of the 
judiciary system itself, which led to a lack of standardisation at a national level. The 
latitude given to sentencing judges means that different sentences exist across 
provinces for similar offences. Until 1996, the only legislation governing sentences 
was to be found in the penalty sections of each of the 350 or so offences described in 
the criminal code.317 The only guidance available on how to sentence when a specific 
offence did not provide for a minimum or maximum penalty, or even if it did, on how 
to determine the appropriate sentence in between, was from the Courts of Appeal in 
each province. The introduction of the sentencing purposes and principles into 
legislation in 1996318 was meant to provide more congruency but, as we have seen 
under section 3.1, the little guidance offered by this codification had in reality very 
little impact on court’s sentencing practices. Unfortunately, the situation cannot be 
rectified by appealing to higher courts since, at the national level, sentence disparities 
due to the courts’ application of different standards across the country do not 
constitute a sufficient reason for a leave of appeal to be granted by the Supreme Court 
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of Canada. In fact, the highest court does not hear appeals against sentences unless 
there is an issue of national interest that the court believes needs to be resolved.319 
 
Disparity in sentencing was hence a common issue in both jurisdictions, even if due to 
different considerations. In order to address this matter, both legislatures have chosen 
to introduce mandatory minima as a means to decrease sentencing disparities over 
other remedies.320  
 
Despite the fact that Canada and South Africa share a common legacy of strong 
judicial discretion, the two countries have major historical, social and cultural 
differences, which cannot help but have an influence on their current judicial systems. 
Indeed, it is said that ‘in attempting to understand the impact of judicial politics and 
attitudes, it is necessary to place courts’ decisions in the context of the different 
circumstances, “legal cultures” and “socio-political values” that exist in a particular 
society’.321 
 
On the one hand, Canada is described as a stable and developed country. It has been a 
democracy since its beginnings as a country, in 1867. Respect of human rights is a 
principle that has been established for decades and Canada is perceived as a precursor 
in this field, being party to many multilateral and international human rights 
treaties. 322  Capital punishment, for example, was abolished from the Canadian 
Criminal Code in 1976 by Bill C-84.323 The abolition of the death penalty was a 
significant development in the advancement of human rights. Everyone's right to life 
was subsequently enshrined in s7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.324 
In this context, the Supreme Court of Canada’s rejection of judicial authority when 
asked to promote the rights of an accused325 is surprising. The best years of the 
Charter seem to be over as the Court now favours constitutional minimalism when it 
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has to decide between law enforcement and the promotion of constitutional rights. The 
shifts in both constitutional law and sentencing practices have changed the Court’s 
position, reducing judicial power to the benefit of executive power.  
On the other hand, the South African experience has occurred in a totally different 
context. The country had to wait until 1996 to see the abolition of capital 
punishment,326 which followed shortly after the advent of democracy and the adoption 
of a Bill of rights.327 That was some ten years after the Canadian experience. In 
reality, the legacy of apartheid - poverty, abuse and inequalities - has placed the 
country far behind Canada, as the situation remains precarious today. South Africa is 
far from knowing Canada’s stability, and there is an ongoing struggle over questions 
of human rights.  
As explained under section 5.1 of this paper, the change from parliamentary to 
constitutional supremacy is probably the most critical shift that occurred during the 
transition to democracy in South Africa. The effect of parliamentary supremacy was to 
ensure that judges were mere technicians who could not mitigate the effects of unjust 
laws only on procedural and technical grounds.328 However, the introduction of a new 
Constitution and Bill of Rights has seen the courts in South Africa being used as an 
alternative to the democratic process of changing law in Parliament. 329  The 
establishment of the Constitutional Court contributed greatly to this end. In effect, it is 
suggested that constitutional interpretation can differ fundamentally from the 
interpretation of statutes and this can give the courts the opportunity to shape the 
society in which they are located.330 In return, the weighing of constitutional values is 
influenced not only by the personal values to which the adjudicating judges subscribe, 
but also to some degree by the norms and values of the legal and wider communities 
in which they live.331   
 
In an article about the political role of the South African Constitutional Court, Sarkin 
suggests that: 
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‘the most important factor determining interpretation is the composition of the 
adjudicating court, as the orientation of individual judges has profound effect on 
their interpretation of such issues as which right to give superior weight to and 
how various rights ought to be balanced. Who the judges are and the manner in 
which they are appointed is highly relevant to the outcome of a decision.’ 332  
 
This fact is highly relevant and provides a probable explanation for the turn in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in recent years.  
 
7.4 Political influence 
The Supreme Court of Canada consists of the Chief Justice of Canada and eight 
judges appointed by the Governor General of Canada, the Monarch's federal 
representative.333 The Governor General makes such appointments based on the 
advice of the federal Cabinet. However, while the Governor General holds the legal 
power to appoint Supreme Court justices, the choice of who will be appointed is 
actually done by the federal Prime Minister and his Cabinet. This is due to a 
constitutional convention 334  in which the Governor General does not use any 
discretion in exercising his or her power of appointment. Instead, it is regular practice 
for the Governor General to simply act on whichever recommendation is put forth by 
the elected federal Cabinet. Moreover, the Prime Minister has the final say on which 
candidate will be recommended to the Governor General,335 which means that in 
practice, the opportunity to make recommendations combined with the power of final 
decision essentially give the Prime Minister the latitude to appoint the Supreme Court 
judges. There are currently eight members of the court, with one seat vacant. Since 
2006, five of the eight judges have been appointed by the Conservative Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper.336 
Compared with the Canadian process, the appointment of Constitutional judges in 
South Africa does not seem to be determined by ‘political patronage’. According to 
s174 to 178 of the Constitution, the power to appoint judges is bestowed on the 
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President of the Judicial Service Commission, after consultation with the Chief Justice 
and the leaders of political parties represented in the National Assembly. The choice 
of candidates is made from a list drawn up by the Commission, following a call for 
nominations and the holding of public interviews.337 
 
Since the political orientation of ‘individual judges has profound effect on their 
interpretation [of such issues] as which right to give superior weight to and how 
various rights ought to be balanced’,338 the appointment process of judges for the 
country’s highest Court becomes primordial in the separation of powers and the 
safeguard of judicial independence. In the current Canadian context, the majority of 
judges are aligned with the Conservative party in power. Moreover, the appointment 
process as described above and the current composition of the Court is a good 
indicator that the judges’ political allegiance was almost certainly taken into account 
for their nomination. It is therefore easy to grasp the reluctance of the Supreme Court 
to pronounce against legislation and its keenness to share the executive power’s 
position, even in a society where democracy is ‘well established’. As Sakin points out, 
the key issue concerning judicial activism in the political context ‘in relation to the 
role of the courts is the willingness of the judiciary to intervene, and the extent of such 
intervention, in terrain traditionally seen to be legislative.’339 
 
When considering the imposition of mandatory minima in both jurisdictions, it 
becomes evident that the recent introduction of such penalties in Canada serves 
political goals. The latest introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in South 
Africa was in 1997, for the commission of serious offences. Since then, although the 
Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutional validity of minimum sentences, 
their application has constantly been challenged by courts.  As we have seen in the 
case of rape, although the imposition of life imprisonment as a prescribed sentence 
was not found unconstitutional, this is now mainly a theoretical matter, as in practice 
the imposition of the prescribed minima is now the exception. In Canada, on the other 
hand, we have seen that since the Supreme Court’s intervention in the case of 
Smith,340 it has raised the burden very high for minimum sentences to meet the test of 
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being ‘grossly disproportionate’. Despite attempts to challenge their constitutional 
validity, the Supreme Court has constantly urged sentencing courts to apply the 
prescribed minima without consideration. The Court’s position is worrying given that 
the government has recently reintroduced mandatory minimum sentences, in a context 
that does not justify the need to be ‘tougher on crime’. 
 
7.5 Is there a need for harsher sentences? 
Criminological theorist David Garland341 suggests that, over the past forty years, 
crime control strategies have changed in ‘developed countries’ such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom and, though perhaps in a gentler fashion, in Canada. 
Garland suggests that these countries have generally experienced a shift to two types 
of government action: enhanced control and expressive punishment.342 In this context, 
society’s perception of crime and security, as expressed by general public opinion, 
becomes one of the main factors to be taken into account. As Garland points out, ‘the 
new penal ideal is that the public be protected and its sentiments expressed’.343 
Garland continues his argument: 
‘Where might one expect such ‘punitiveness’ from the elite to show most? If its members 
are looking for punitive segregation this attitude should be most salient with respect to 
repeat and violent offenders. These offenders are precisely the kind of individuals 
targeted by most of the three-strikes legislation and by many of Canada’s mandatory 
minimum sentence laws. People overestimate the amount of crime that involves violence, 
and they overestimate the likelihood that offenders will re-offend.’344 
 
Canadian politicians see a need to adopt penal policies to tackle the crime level and 
keep the population safe even though there is actually no real need for such policies. 
Canadian society shares a misconception of the criminal justice, overestimating 
numbers of repeat and violent offenders. 
In the early 80’s, Doob and Roberts,345 approached by officials of the Department of 
Justice Canada, conducted a series of interesting studies on public attitudes toward and 
beliefs about the criminal justice system. Their general findings were that if ‘it is well 
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known that members of the Canadian public are not completely happy with their 
criminal justice system’,346 the data are quite clear:  
‘the Canadian public does have views about the sentences that are given and they are 
generally quite different from the best estimates available […]. The public views crime as 
being more violent than it seems to be, sees the justice system as responding too 
leniently, and in some instances, more leniently than it in fact does, and feels changes 
should be made in this system.’347  
 
As an example, Doob and Roberts have found that most crimes committed in Canada 
were not violent. In 1982, it was estimated that less than 10 per cent of crime involved 
violence, yet almost three-quarters of Canadians (73.9 per cent) who responded to the 
questions asked thought that at least 30 per cent of crime involved violence. It is the 
same story for the re-offender: statistics suggested that, at the very most, about 13 per 
cent of those released from prison on parole committed violent crimes after their 
release. However, almost two-thirds of respondents (62 per cent) estimated that the 
number was at least three times that (i.e. 40 per cent or more).348 
 
To understand and interpret these views and beliefs about sentences, Doob and 
Roberts used a number of different methods. In order to find out how people 
responded to sentences as portrayed in the mass media, they compared subjects’ 
reactions to different accounts of four separate cases. In three of the studies they 
compared one or more newspaper accounts to court-based documents, and in the 
fourth, comparisons were made only among different newspaper accounts of the same 
sentence.349 They found that, generally, the subjects who read the transcript were the 
most likely to think that the sentence was appropriate. In no cases were the readers of 
the newspaper accounts more likely to approve of the sentence than the readers of 
court-based documents. Furthermore, the last of their studies showed that, while 
readers of a newspaper felt that the sentence was too lenient, people evaluating exactly 
the same sentence for the same man for the same offence, when given the information 
available to the courts, saw this same sentence as too harsh.350 
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These findings led the authors to formulate an interesting conclusion for the attention 
of policy makers. The adoption of harsher sentences is not the outcome actually 
desired by society and, therefore, there is no need to adopt a political agenda to 
address issues that are not really a concern: 
‘[…] As we have noted, however, public attitudes to sentencing are shaped not by the 
reality which takes place in courts, but by the news media. It is not the sentence itself that 
people are reacting to (since it was constant across accounts) but the context in which the 
sentence is placed. This suggests that policy makers should not interpret the public’s 
apparent desire for harsher penalties at face value; they should understand this 
widespread perception of leniency is founded upon incomplete and frequently 
inaccurate news accounts.’351 [emphasis added] 
 
Even though these studies were conducted in the early 80’s, their conclusion remains 
relevant today. Indeed, it has been demonstrated over the years that the Canadian 
society does not generally adhere to a policy of ‘tough on crime’. In an article from 
1997, Roberts352 relies on the report of the Sentencing Commission353 to highlight that 
‘there is considerable support for greater use of alternatives to imprisonment for non-
violent offenders’. For example, when members of the public were asked to identify 
the single most effective way to control crime, fewer than one quarter chose making 
sentences harsher. Over half favoured reducing the level of unemployment or 
increasing the number of social programs.’354 
 
It is interesting to note that, in comparison, ‘tough on crime’ policies could be more 
easily justified in South Africa which, recent statistics show, has an actual high level 
of violent crime. In the 2009-2010 calendar year, for example, the number of serious 
crimes committed in South Africa was estimated at 2 121 887. Over 30 per cent of 
these were contact crimes.355 More specifically, 30 per cent of all crimes were assault 
with grievous bodily harm, 29.2 per cent were common assault, 16.8 per cent were 
aggravated robbery and 10.1 per cent were sexual offences.356 But despite a level of 
violent crime that remains very high over the years, the last introduction of mandatory 
minima into legislation was in 1997. This difference between the recent policies 
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chosen in the two countries reveals a political agenda that it is quite different for the 
two governments. 
 
In reality, statutory mandatory minima are legislative tools promoted by the executive 
power to attract the public’s favour and secure the population. However, there is no 
need for the Canadian government to rely on such a policy: first, harsher sentences for 
violent crimes or re-offenders are not justified in Canada. Second, as we will see in the 
final section, mandatory minima create a false sense of security, a sense that 
something effective is being done against the high crime rate. 357  It is the 
misperception shared by society about the level of crime and the seriousness of crime 
that the Canadian government most needs to tackle. It should also seek to promote 
alternatives that have proven to be more effective in reducing crimes. Mandatory 
penalties are in fact ineffective as crime-control measures, especially when contrasted 
with other measures that use the same amount of public resources.358 
 
7.6 Reducing disparity, improving efficiency and effectiveness 
We have discussed the fact that, because both Canada and South Africa are 
jurisdictions where judges have had a great discretion in imposing sentences, 
mandatory penalties have been justified as a means to provide greater consistency in 
sentencing. However, limiting the discretion of judges for the benefit of statutory 
sentences was not the only option available to legislatures for addressing this issue. 
For example, Terblanche359 suggests that ‘it is fairly widely accepted that there are 
four techniques that can be used to reduce disparity’ and provide greater consistency 
in sentencing. Such alternatives can be found in the enactment of statutory sentencing 
principles, various systems of sentencing guidelines, judicial self-regulation and 
mandatory minimum sentencing schemes.360 
 
 In 1996, Canada opted for the enactment of statutory sentencing purposes and 
principles, but as we have seen earlier, these were general, and have in reality been 
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seen as little more than a codification of the status quo established by the courts. For 
its part, the South African Reform Commission 361  has proposed a system of 
sentencing guidelines that are intended to offer an alternative to prescribed minima. If 
the recommendations of this commission have not replaced the existing law, it is 
possible that they have at least precluded the enactment of further mandatory 
minimum sentences.  
 
We can therefore hypothesise that the actual Canadian government would not have 
succeeded in the reintroduction of mandatory minima if the Canadian Sentencing 
Commission were still in place. Even if, despite any recommendations, the 
government had decided to enact statutory minima, the Commission could have 
suggested a holistic and effective interpretation of these dispositions for courts to 
apply. For example, based on the existing sentencing principles, the Commission 
could have set new guidelines for the application of mandatory penalties, which would 
have taken into account the judicial demand for sentencing discretion as well as the 
limited capacity of the penal system to carry out the sentences of the courts.362 
Unfortunately, as covered under the first section of this paper, Parliament decided to 
abolish the first and only Sentencing Commission that existed in Canada, with 
unfortunate consequences for the Canadian criminal justice system.  
 
 Looking over the imposition of the Act 105 of 1997, the South African Reform 
Commission examined judicial perceptions of mandatory minimums and proposed a 
Sentencing Framework Bill, which excluded the mandatory minimum sentencing 
regime and made recommendations regarding the basic sentencing principles. 
Although this Bill has not been adopted in its original form by the Parliament, it has 
led to intense lobbying efforts, and public debate surrounded mandatory provisions 
during the 2005 and 2007 pre-review periods. 363 It was on the basis of these 
recommendations that the Governance and Administration Cabinet Committee 
introduced the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill,364 which attempted to 
address some of the unintended consequences of the Act. 
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In this report of 2000, the Reform Commission notably found that an ideal sentencing 
system: 
‘should be seen to promote consistency in sentencing, deal appropriately with concerns 
that particular offences are not being regarded with an appropriate degree of seriousness, 
allow for victim participation and restorative initiatives and, at the same time, produce 
sentencing outcomes that are within the capacity of the State to enforce in the long 
term.’365 
 
The best way of achieving such an ideal system, the Law Commission concluded, is, 
first, to clearly state the basic sentencing principles in legislation and, secondly, to set 
up a sentencing council to provide sentencing guidelines.366 The Law Commission’s 
recommendations regarding the basic sentencing principles are contained in the Draft 
Sentencing Framework Bill. These principles are similar to the Canadian principles 
enacted in 1996.367 While the overall purpose in sentencing is seen as retribution,368 
proportionality is described as the primary principle.369  
 
The draft legislation also provides for an ‘optimal combination’ of aims towards 
which the sentence should strive: restoring the rights of victims, protecting society, 
and affording the offender the opportunity of a crime-free life.370 According to the 
Sentencing Framework Bill, these principles enunciated by the Law Commission 
would assist the Sentencing Council in its primary function of drawing up sentencing 
guidelines.371 As an alternative to mandatory minimum sentences, the draft legislation 
suggests the introduction of guidelines which would ‘specif[y] sentencing options and 
their severity for a particular category […] or sub-category of offence’.372  
 
There is one criterion identified by the Law Commission in determining the extent of 
such guidelines that is particularly interesting. It requires that account must be taken 
of the capacity of the correctional system, both in respect to prisons and community 
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corrective facilities.373 This implies that sentencing guidelines must be sensitive to the 
resources available and/or allocated in the determination of the appropriate 
punishment. The costs-benefit consideration is particularly noteworthy when 
considering the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences and evokes questions 
about the Canadian government’s policy.   
 
It is true that when the government abolished the Sentencing Commission in the late 
80’s it was mainly for financial reasons. However, the same government has 
continued to enact mandatory minima, which are proven to be very costly and 
especially ineffective when compared with crime-control measures that use the same 
amount of public resources.374 Indeed, ‘much of the academic literature shows that 
incapacitating individuals by increasing their sentence length has a slight effect on 
crime rates [and that] incapacitation is not a cost-effective way of combating 
crime’.375 Among others, US studies suggest that better use can be made of financial 
resources through education and social support. RAND researchers estimate that: 
 
‘The impact of a $1 million investment in…cash and other incentives to disadvantaged 
students to graduate from high school would result in a reduction of 258 crimes per year, 
and parent training therapy for families with young “acting out” children 160 crimes per 
year, compared to a reduction of 60 crimes a year through building and operating 
prisons.’376 
 
The figures suggest that appropriate social programmes may be at least twice as cost-
effective as imprisonment in combating crime. Of course, such social programmes are 
not, strictly speaking, an alternative to imprisonment, as they are not always 
appropriate sentences for judges to apply. Such programs must first exist and count on 
sufficient resources to constitute a real alternative to punishment. In any case, the law 
should not restrict their imposition, i.e. it must be possible to punish an offender for 
the offence of which he or she is found guilty by a penalty other than imprisonment. 
Hence, social programmes would often not offer an alternative to judges for 
sentencing of most severe crimes. This is why such alternatives and any preventive or 
rehabilitating measures should be considered by Parliament as a meaningful part of 
sentencing policies.  
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Doob and Cesaroni377 also denounce the high cost of punitive policies, including 
mandatory minima. Not only the ‘human cost’ is high, but also the ‘social cost’ 
associated to such policies, which makes it clear that these policies do not serve the 
best interests of the society. On the one hand, the great number of prisoners serving 
mandatory terms means an increase in prison populations and budgets.378 On the other 
hand, this represents a cost to society as an otherwise potentially productive member 
of the community becomes a burden rather than a contributor.379  
 
Even beyond a cost effective consideration, the evidence of the past 50 years is clear: 
mandatory minimum sentences do not deter any more than less harsh, proportionate 
sentences.380 
 
In previous sections of this paper, many examples were given of strong arguments put 
forward by renowned scholars in the field381 against the introduction of mandatory 
minimum sentences into legislation. Furthermore, as we have seen in the case of both 
Canada and South Africa, the choice of statutory mandatory minima has not proven to 
meet the goals and purposes of sentencing policies. One of the major reasons for this 
failure is probably attributed to a certain dichotomy between pure theories (such as 
deterrence), on which Politicians rely to attract the public’s favour, and the reality of  
offending behaviour. In fact, many studies highlight the fact that offenders are not 
generally aware of the sentences they may face when committing crimes,382 and 
therefore the severity of the sentence that they may face has no impact. As justice 
Chaskalson points out in S v Makwanyane,383 ‘the greatest deterrent to crime is the 
likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and punished’. 384 
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The sentence imposed on an offender for the commission of a criminal act is not an 
end in itself but the outcome of broader policies that should reflect society’s choices. 
Arie Freiberg385 suggests that ‘crime prevention strategies are more likely to be 
successful if they recognize and deal with the roles of emotions, symbols, 
irrationalism, expressionism, non-utilitarianism, faith, belief, and religion in the 
criminal justice system’. He adds that we ‘must deal with the affective as well as the 
effective, with both the instrumental and sentimental aspects of penal policy’, as 
‘[s]uccessful penal reform must take account of the emotions people feel in the face of 
wrongdoing.’386 Citing Gaubatz,387 Freiberg suggests that the public’s punitive attitude 
to crime may be based on four motivations: security, desert, compassion, and a desire 
for major social changes to improve society.388  
 
If Freiberg is right, moving from mandatory minimum sentences to just sentences may 
require a careful crafting of crime policy. A policy that focuses on fair sentences, 
compassion and the understanding of victims as well as offenders, along with a policy 
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The decision to incorporate statutory minimum penalties in a sentencing regime is, in 
theory, the legislator’s. However, from the very first chapter of this paper, we have 
seen that the imposition of mandatory minima in Canada was guided by a strong right-
wing political influence. In the face of conflicting recommendations of the Canadian 
Sentencing Commission, the government preferred to abolish the commission, and 
keep mandatory minima on the legislative agenda. 
 
As explained in the first part of this paper, one of the problems with the Canadian 
regime is that the law does not provide a deviation clause that would allow a departure 
from the mandatory sentence when circumstances justify it. Rather, the law gives way 
to the parameters established by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,390 
where only a sentence which amounts to a ‘cruel and unusual punishment’391 under 
the circumstances can be set aside. Over the years, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
established a high burden for this test to be met, leaving a very slight chance for an 
accused to escape the statutory penalty. 
 
While the current Canadian Parliament favours such a restrictive sentencing regime, 
mandatory minima receive little support among members of the judiciary and arouse 
the opposition of many academics. And with good reason: as we have seen in chapter 
3, mandatory penalties in Canada infringe the principle of proportionality, affect the 
severity of sentences in general and create distortions to the efficiency of the judiciary 
system. However, this has not precluded the recent enactment of the Safe Streets and 
Communities Act,392 which adopts the same legislative formula and prescribes the 
imposition of mandatory sentences, without an exemption clause or sunset clause. In 
contradiction to what the Canadian Sentencing Commission had recommended in 
1988,393 presumptive guidelines were not adopted either. 
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The sentencing regime of South Africa was chosen as a comparative study to the 
Canadian regime, as it provides a recent legislative framework for the imposition of 
mandatory minima. Moreover, it incorporates an exemption clause, a solution that 
could be implemented in Canada. As presented under section 5.1, the sentencing 
guidelines in South Africa are provided from common law and the courts’ 
interpretation. Although Canadian judges benefit from statutory sentencing 
principles,394 these are in fact the incorporation of common law principles into law 
and do not constitute a major difference in the sentencing processed of the two 
jurisdictions. Moreover, the fact that both jurisdictions evolved from a tradition of 
discretionary power has offered an interesting comparison as to the way that the courts 
have applied mandatory penalties. Likewise, as we have seen with the case study of 
Makwanyane,395 South Africa has benefited from the advent of a Constitution and a 
Bill of rights as a basis for challenging sentencing law, which was another notable 
similarity with Canada.  
 
Unlike Canadian law, the South African legislation provides a clause designed to 
avoid the imposition of penalties that would be disproportionate to the crime or would 
amount to an injustice under the circumstances. However, we have observed that the 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ clause396 has not turned out to be an 
effective ‘middle ground’ to balance the imposition of mandatory minima. Since the 
clause itself provides so little guidance, it is difficult for the Superior Court of Appeal 
to establish consistent parameters for its application. In the case of South Africa, the 
exemption clause has instead become a tool which the judiciary uses to manifest its 
disapproval of the affront to judicial discretion.  
 
In both countries, the choice of mandatory minimum sentences was justified by the 
need to strengthen criminal law and to provide greater consistency in sentencing. On 
the first point, the last chapter of this paper has highlighted the fact that, in reality, the 
two societies have different legal cultures and do not share the same socio-political 
values. South Africa’s stability is precarious and the country has a high crime rate, 
with a high rate of violent crimes. The Canadian reality is different: statistics analysed 
in section 7.5 demonstrate that there is no need to adopt penal policies in order to 
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tackle the crime level and keep the population safe. Having compared the appointment 
process for the highest Courts’ judges in both jurisdictions, and understood that the 
political orientation of individual judges has a profound effect on their interpretation 
of various rights protected by law, we must conclude is that the reintroduction of 
mandatory minima in the Canadian 2012 Act cannot be justified by the need to impose 
a deterrent against crime. Rather, it indicates the interference of a right-wing political 
agenda in the judicial sphere.  
 
Thus, the need for greater consistency remains. However, after a deep analysis of the 
purposes, consequences and impacts of mandatory minimum penalties throughout this 
paper, the conclusion is that the reintroduction of mandatory minima in the Canadian 
sentencing regime is not the most effective means to achieve this purpose. No matter 
how they are stipulated or the way in which they operate within the law,397 mandatory 
minimum sentences should be approached with caution. Canada should have opted for 
the implementation of a sentencing commission. Such an institution can suggest 
reforms which would enable a strong deterrent against crime, whilst ensuring that 
consistency is kept throughout the sentencing process and keeping the sentences in 
line with the sentencing principles. Taking into account the South African experience, 
as well as the theoretical and practical considerations discussed in this paper, it 
appears that the establishment of a sentencing commission would have been a much 
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